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I. INTRODUCTION
That he's mad, 'tis true: 'tis true 'tis pity,
And pity 'tis 'tis true.
-William Shakespeare1
Throughout Anglo-American legal history, there has been a
general agreement, based on numerous rationales, 2 that mentally
incompetent inmates should not be executed for their crimes.3 The
recurring problem, however, is how to define "incompetence" or "in-
sanity."4 Legislatures and courts have sought to provide a common-
sense definition, but in practice judges must confront highly techni-
cal terminology from the ever evolving field of psychiatryfi Addi-
tionally, the definition must be flexible enough to apply to a variety
of cases, while being universal enough to assure that all defendants
are treated fairly and equally. 6
At hearings to determine a prisoner's competency to be exe-
cuted, courts usually hear testimony from several qualified mental
health experts, each offering his or her own version of an inmate's
level of mental illness. In the end, however, judges must make the
final determination of competency-a decision that literally decides
an inmate's fate. Numerous articles and notes have addressed the
general philosophical or moral problems with measuring compe-
tency to incur the death penalty.7 Some commentators view the
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. 1943); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 24-25 (1769).
4. For a discussion of the distinction between the terms "incompetent' and "insane," see in.
fra Part V.C.2.
5. See infra Part VI.A.
6. Although it is difficult to articulate, and outside the scope of this Note, there may be an
equal protection problem with judges or juries applying the often vague definitions of incompe-
tency differently to similarly situated defendants.
7. See, e.g., Rachelle Deckert Dick, Ford v. Wainwright: Warning-Sanity on Death Row
May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 47 LA. L. REV. 1351 (1987); Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital
Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical Thought Supporting the Justices'Posi.
tions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992); Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale,
Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement,
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problem from the perspective of psychiatrists or psychologists; oth-
ers consider specific problems such as drug-induced competency.8
This Note will approach the problem from a different perspective-
that of the courts. By understanding the unenviable position in
which current statutory and common law definitions place judges, it
will become apparent that state legislatures, or perhaps the Su-
preme Court, need to provide more sensible standards for judges to
use in determining competency to be executed.
Part II of this Note provides a brief explanation of the long-
standing common law rule against executing the insane, as well as
the traditional rationales for the rule. Additionally, Part II offers a
summary of the Supreme Court's determination that the Eighth
Amendment 9 prohibits executing the insane, as set forth in Ford u.
Wainwright.10 The plurality in Ford examined the procedural re-
quirements for determining competency to be executed, but did not
provide a proper definition of "competency" to be used in such pro-
ceedings." Justice Powell's concurring opinion, on the other hand,
found that the appropriate standard is whether the prisoner is
aware of the punishment she is about to suffer and the reasons she
is to suffer it. Finally, Part II provides a brief explanation of the
American Bar Association's view that courts should also consider a
prisoner's ability to assist counsel in her own defense.
Part III summarizes the current standards for measuring
competency used in several key states, focusing on Florida, Tennes-
see, and Mississippi. The standards can generally be divided into
two categories: the single-prong "cognitive" test, and the two-prong
"assistance" test. Part IV then describes in detail three recent cases
applying the various rules, all of which display the daunting task
judges face in weighing conflicting expert testimony.
Part V of this Note discusses the numerous problems with
these standards for measuring competency. The major concerns re-
late to defining when an execution is "imminent" so that a compe-
tency determination is appropriate, deciding which terminology to
use in making this determination, and understanding the role of
51 LA. L. REV. 995 (1991); Rochelle Graff Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be
Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic
Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361 (1994); Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law
and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1986); Rhonda K. Jenkins, Note, Fit to Die: Drug-
Induced Competency for the Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL U. LJ. 149 (1995).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
10. 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
11. Id. at 418.
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the judge in applying the testimony of mental health experts to the
common language definition of competency provided in state stat-
utes.
Finally, Part VI of this Note suggests that state legislatures
need to be more meticulous with the exact language they use when
defining "incompetency," specifically considering the language that
expert witnesses will use. As a more uniform solution, this Note
proposes that the Supreme Court complete what it initiated in Ford
v. Wainwright by more specifically defining the applicable standard
courts should use in determining a person's competency to face the
death penalty.
II. THE RULE AGAINST EXECUTING THE INSANE
A. Common Law Rule
The rule against executing the insane has long been a part of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Sir Edward Coke 12 explained its
origins in English common law: "By intendment of law the execu-
tion of the offender is for example ... but so it is not when a mad
man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against
law, and of extream inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example
to others."'13 Other origins of the rule focused on the notion that an
insane person might be unable to make an argument that her exe-
cution should be stayed. 14 American courts have consistently ap-
plied this rule, 15 and commentators have defended its application. 16
12. Sir Edward Coke was an extremely influential English judge who "knew more about the
common law than any in or before his era." NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON
LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 301 (1997). His Institutes were an
attempt at articulating the principles and procedures of the common law, mostly published post-
humously. Id. at 302. It consisted of four volumes: property, statutes, criminal law, and courts of
justice. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 120 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984).
13. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (Lon-
don, E. & R. Brooke 1797); see 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (London, Richard
Tonson & Jacob Tonson 1678 ); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2
(Dublin, Eliz. Lynch 1788); Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 How. St.
Tr. 474, 477 (1685).
14. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 864 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co.
1938) (1769) (arguing that if someone convicted of a capital offense after judgment "becomes of
nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed; for peradventure, says the humanity of English law,
had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or
execution").
15. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. 1943) C'One who has been convicted of a
capital crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, and who thereafter becomes insane,
cannot be put to death while in that condition."); Daniel J. Broderick, Note, Insanity of the Con.
2444 [Vol. 54:2441
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In the 1986 decision Ford v. Wainwright,17 the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly stated that the Eighth Amendment 18 prohibits a state from
inflicting the death penalty on a prisoner who is insane. 19 To this
day, no state allows the execution of someone determined to be in-
sane. 2
0
This begs the question of how to define competency, espe-
cially since studies have shown that the pressures of sitting on
death row result in a high degree of once sane inmates developing
severe mental impairments.21 The situation has become more com-
plex now that the rule against executing the insane has been ex-
tended to allow a person, found sane when convicted, to have her
competency reassessed just prior to execution. 22 Faced with such
decisions, judges are in need of a well-crafted competency standard
to use in their analysis of the prisoner's claims and the often-
conflicting expert testimony.
B. Rationales for the Rule
There are generally six rationales used to justify the rule
against executing an incompetent person.23 These rationales were
outlined by the Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright.2 4
demned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979) (discussing pre-Ford cases concerning execution of those
deemed insane).
16. See, e.g., Schopp, supra note 7 at 997.
17. 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see infra Part 1.0 for a full discussion of Ford.
18. See supra note 9.
19. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. The Supreme Court had previously considered the constitu.
tionality of the death penalty in general. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 309 (1977) (distin-
guishing Furman to its facts, and finding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional if
imposed properly); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (holding Florida's procedures for
imposing the death penalty were constitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196 (1976)
(holding that Georgia's procedures for imposition of the death penalty, amended in response to
Furman, did not involve cruel and unusual punishment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-
40 (1972) (holding that, under the specific circumstances of the case, the imposition of the death
penalty would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
20. See infra Part IHI.
21. See Byers, supra note 8, at 367-68.
22. Ford, 477 U.S. at 435 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. See SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LW 706 (3d ed.
1985); RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTE24: CML AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 988 (3d ed. 1999); Byers, supra note 8, at 371-75; Schopp, supra note 7, at 998-1009;
Ward, supra note 8, at 49-57. For additional rationales that have been suggested, such as tacit
clemency, see Schopp, supra note 7, at 1004-05. For a discussion of the importance of tailoring
the test for insanity to coincide with the rationale behind the rule, see Sanford M. Pastroff,
Eighth Amendment-The Constitutional Rights of the Insane on Death Row, 77 J. CRU1.. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 844, 864 (1986). For a discussion of the differing philosophical views of the Su-
preme Court Justices concerning the death penalty, see Donnelly, supra note 7.
24. 477 U.S. at 407-10.
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The first rationale holds that madness is punishment enough
in itself.25 Commentators have criticized this rationale, however,
because it logically means that an inmate's recovery subjects him or
her to execution. 26 Rather, if madness were punishment enough
unto itself, the prisoner's sentence would be commuted and he or
she would be released upon recovery. 27 Furthermore, modern defini-
tions of incompetency are not restricted to what traditionally was
considered "madness."
28
The second rationale for not executing the insane is that im-
posing the death penalty on an incompetent person simply offends
humanity in its cruelty. 29 This reasoning has been used for hun-
dreds of years,30 and closely resembles the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.3' It is difficult, however, to
separate this rationale from an argument against the death penalty
in general.
32
The third justification for the rule is religious in nature,
based on the notion that an incompetent person is unable to make
peace with God, and therefore, should not have his or her life
ended. 33 As the Ford Court stated: "[I]t is uncharitable to dispatch
an offender 'into another world, when he is not of capacity to fit
25. Id. at 407-08 ('furiosus solo furorepunitur") (citing BLAcKSTONE, supra note 14, at 395);
see also REISNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 988; Byers, supra note 8, at 372; Ward, supra note 8, at
50.
26. Ward, supra note 8, at 50.
27. Byers, supra note 8, at 373.
28. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Insanity did not become a defense for criminal
acts in England until the fourteenth century, and even then the authorities were very general in
their terminology. See HENRY WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 17 (1933).
Early commentators merely argued that an "idiot' or "madman" did not know what they wore
doing, so they could not have the requisite felonious intent. Id. at 19. The seminal English case is
M'Naghten's Case, which focused exclusively on cognitive disability and found a person insane if:
(1) she does not know the nature and quality of the act she is doing; or (2) if she did know it, she
did not know what she was doing was wrong. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); see JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 319 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the M'Naughten test in
detail). Subsequent general insanity rules have switched the focus to whether an act is the prod-
uct of a mental defect or whether the person appreciates the nature of her conduct. DRESSLER,
supra, at 322-24.
29. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407; see REISNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 988; Ward, supra note 8, 52.
30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 9.
32. See Ward, supra note 8, at 52. For example, why is it cruel to execute someone who was
sane when she committed the crime and sane when she stood trial and was convicted? Would
the answer to that question also counsel against executing someone who remained sane through
her execution? What if the person is competent but has an extremely low IQ? What if she was
abused as a child? See infra Part V.
33. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407; see also REISNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 988; Byers, supra note
8, at 371; Ward, supra note 8, at 51.
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himself for it.' "4 Even beyond the First Amendment's prohibition
against the establishment of religion,3 5 however, there are numer-
ous difficulties with basing a law in a pluralistic society on theo-
logical considerations.3 6
The fourth rationale, taking a more modern tone, is based on
the idea that an incompetent person might be unable to provide
counsel with last minute information that would cause the court to
vacate the sentence.3 7 In explaining its standard for determining
competency, the American Bar Association expressed a similar con-
cern: that allowing the execution of an incompetent person would
erode the integrity of the criminal justice system.38 This rationale,
however, has been criticized because an incompetent defendant has
access to counsel who can make the necessary arguments on his or
her behalf through numerous available avenues of appeal.39 Fur-
thermore, it is simply unlikely that a defendant after both a trial
and sentencing might suddenly remember helpful information. 40
The fifth rationale argues that execution of an incompetent
person would have no deterrent effect on the population because it
provides no example to competent people in society. 41 Assuming
that the death penalty does have a deterrent effect, there is no rea-
son why the execution of someone who committed the act while
sane, but has since become incompetent, will not deter someone
contemplating a similar crime. 42 As one commentator observed:
"Presumably, the condemned inmate's incompetency would not
34. Id. (quoting Hawles, supra note 13, at 477).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofre-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... ."); see Byers, supra note 8, at 372.
36. See Ward, supra note 8, at 51 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, A MRCAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW
§§ 14-1 to 14-13 (1978 & Supp. 1979)). Barbara Ward notes that if this rationale were fundamen-
tal, then a prisoner's realization of his moral guilt would need to be a component of any compe-
tency test, which it is not. Id.; see infra note 191 and accompanying text. In particular, such a
requirement would preclude the execution of sociopaths. Ward, supra note 8, at 51. The under-
pinnings of this rationale seem to be based on a Christian idea of providing last rites for those
about to die, a notion absent in many other religions. See Geoffrey Hazard & David Louisell,
Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L REV. 381, 388 (1962).
37. Ward, supra note 8, at 56-57.
38. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 (2d ed. 1989) (CThe rule rests less on sym-
pathy for the sentenced convict than concern for the integrity of the criminal justice system.").
39. Ford, 477 U.S. at 419 (PoweU, J., concurring).
40. Ward, supra note 8, at 56-57.
41. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407; see also REISNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 988; Byers, supra note
8, at 373; Ward, supra note 8, at 51.
42. Ward, supra note 8, at 52 (A person about to break the law cannot foresee that he will
become insane after sentencing; rather, he relies on not being apprehended or does not care if he
is apprehended. Thus, exempting an inmate who becomes insane after sentencing should not
substantially dilute the deterrent effect of the death penalty, and life would not be taken unnec-
essarily." (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 36, at 385)).
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negatively affect the public's awareness and understanding that the
condemned inmate is being executed for the commission of a capital
offense."4s
Finally, the sixth rationale for not imposing the death pen-
alty on an incompetent person is that it does not serve the retribu-
tive purposes typically associated with the death penalty.44 The
Ford Court stated that "the community's quest for 'retribution'-the
need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral
quality'-is not served by execution of an insane person, which has
a 'lesser value' than that of the crime for which he is to be pun-
ished."45 If the inmate has no comprehension of why she is being
put to death, then there can be no retributive value for society. This
rationale, if accepted, is perhaps the most persuasive and explains
why current standards require a comprehension by the inmate of
what she has done and why she is being punished for it.
46
Regardless of which rationale, if any, remains persuasive,
the rule is now ingrained in the American legal system and ac-
cepted almost universally. The Ford Court's holding was clear, that
"[w]hether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain
without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of soci-
ety itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment."
47
C. Ford v. Wainwright
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court explicitly held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of insane in-
mates.48 The Ford Court addressed the competence of a man con-
43. Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame"- Competency and the Execution of Condemned In-
mates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 105, 111 (1994) (emphasis added).
44. Ward, supra note 8, at 54 C'Retribution may be defined simply as 'the application of the
pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty.'" (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1968))); see REISNER ET AL., supra note 23, at 988; Byers, supra note 8, at
374-75.
45. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 36, at 387).
46. Ward, supra note 8, at 56; Harding, supra note 43, at 111. See Eric M. Kniskern, Does
Ford v. Wainwright's Denial of Executions of the Insane Prohibit the State From Carrying Out Its
Criminal Justice System?, 26 S.U. L. REV. 171, 184 (1999) (explaining how vengeance, as distinct
from retribution, supports the rule against executing the insane at the most basic human omo.
tional level).
47. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
48. Id. at 409-10. For earlier Supreme Court discussions of death penalty and insanity, see
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); and Phylo
v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); Noblei v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
2448 [Vol. 54:2441
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victed of murder and sentenced to death in Florida. 49 After the gov-
ernor of Florida found the inmate competent to be executed,5 0 his
attorney filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging whether the
statutory procedures Florida followed in determining the inmate's
competency to'be executed violated procedural due process.5' The
Supreme Court found that the procedures did violate due process
and remanded the case.
52
The Florida statute in question required a panel of three
psychiatrists to examine the inmate and determine whether Ford
had "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him."O The panel
was then to report to the governor, who would make the final judg-
ment of competency. 54 The Court did not consider whether Florida's
definition of incompetency was appropriate; rather, it only exam-
ined the procedures required by the statute. 5 Petitioner Ford ar-
gued that the Eighth Amendment 5 and the Due Process Clause 57
required a formal evidentiary hearing be held to determine his com-
petency.5 8 Without requiring a full evidentiary hearing, the Court
held that Florida's procedure failed to achieve even the minimal
degree of reliability that is required to protect any constitu-
tional interest. 59 The Court found three major deficiencies in the
49. 477 U.S. at 401. Although there was no contention that he was incompetent at trial or
sentencing, after conviction, Ford manifested changes in behavior indicating a mental disorder.
Id. at 402.
50. The inmate's attorney followed Florida statutory procedures for determining compe-
tency to be executed, but the governor found him competent. Id. at 404.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 418.
53. Id. at 403-04 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985)). In this case, the three psychiatrists,
although differing somewhat in their medical conclusion, all found that Ford met the statutory
requirements for sanity. Id. at 404.
54. Id. The governor announced without explanation or statement that he would sign Ford's
death warrant. Id.
55. Id. at 410.
56. See supra note 9.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). For a general discussion of the Due Proc-
ess Clause, see GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN IM. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-51 (13th
ed. 1997).
58. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
59. Id. at 413. The Court relied on Townsend v. Sain, which held that in a habeas corpus
proceeding "a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after
a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts." 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963). The Court found:
"[l]n this case, it is clear that no state court has issued any determination to which the presump-
tion of correctness could be said to attach; indeed, no court played any role in the rejection of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Florida procedure: (1) its failure to include the prisoner in the
truth-seeking process; (2) its denial of any opportunity to qhallenge
the panel of state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions; and (3) the
placement of the decision wholly within the executive branch.6 0
Thus, the Florida statute, the Court held, did not have adequate
procedural assurances of accuracy. 61
Although the majority of the Court failed to develop an ap-
propriate standard for determining competency, 62 Justice Powell
addressed this issue. 63 Despite his concurring in the judgment, Jus-
tice Powell asserted that Justice Marshall's majority opinion erred
in seemingly requiring some sort of full scale "sanity trial."64
Rather, Justice Powell emphasized that the inmate seeking a post-
conviction finding of incompetence will have already been judged
competent to stand trial and found guilty of the crime. 65 Since the
subsequent claim of insanity is made against the background of
these prior competency determinations, it would be proper for a
state to presume the petitioner is competent and require a substan-
tial threshold showing of insanity by the accused merely to trigger
any hearing process. 66 After outlining the justifications for the rule
against executing an incompetent inmate, 67 Justice Powell explic-
itly accepted the Florida competency standard: whether the pris-
oner is aware of the punishment she is about to suffer and why she
is to suffer it.68 Several states, he acknowledged, maintained a
petitioner's claim of insanity." Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. The Court thus remanded to the federal
district court to grant a hearing de novo on that question. Id. at 411.
60. See id. at 413-16.
61. Id. at 418; cf. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1031 (D. Ariz. 2001) (stay-
ing an execution because of an inadequate hearing).
62. Many commentators have criticized the Court for failing to identify a test for mental fit-
ness to be executed. See, e.g., Gordon L. Moore III, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the
Executioner's Song, 72 IOWAL. REV. 1461, 1470 (1987); Pastroff, supra note 23, at 866.
63. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 425.
65. Id. at 426.
66. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985)). Thus, the prisoner should prop.
erly bear the burden to show his or her incompetence to be executed. Id.; cf. Scott v. Mitchell, 250
F.3d 1011, 1014-15 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the burden on the prisoner is only to show prob-
able cause for a hearing).
67. See supra Part II.B.
68. Justice Powell explained:
Such a standard appropriately defines the kind of mental deficiency that should
trigger the Eighth Amendment prohibition. If the defendant perceives the con-
nection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the
criminal law is satisfied. And only if the defendant is aware that his death is
approaching can he prepare himself for his passing. Accordingly, I would hold
2450 [Vol. 54:2441
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broader definition of insanity whereby a defendant could not be
executed unless he is able to assist in his own defense. 69 Although
Justice Powell thought this "assistance prong" of a competency test
was unnecessary because of recent expansions in both the right to
counsel and the availability of federal and state collateral review,70
he noted that "[s]tates are obviously free to adopt a more expansive
view of sanity in this context than the one the Eighth Amendment
imposes as a constitutional minimum."71 The Court has apparently
accepted Justice Powell's definition of competency to stand trial,
although only in passing dicta.72 Furthermore, because Justice
Powell represented the fifth and decisive vote in favor of the judg-
ment, his opinion reflects the narrowest grounds for the Court's
judgment, and is controlling on both the state and lower federal
courts.
73
that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are un-
aware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J. concurring).
69. Id. at 422 n.3.
70. The Sixth Circuit recently agreed with Justice Powell that, unlike at common law where
the requirement of assisting council had more force, defendants in modern practice are afforded
broader constitutional guarantees "including the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial
and on appeal and extensive judicial review through direct appeal and state and federal collat-
eral review .... We agree that a prisoner's ability to assist in his defense is not a necessary ele-
ment to a determination of competency to be executed." Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 825-26 (6th
Cir. 2000).
71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989). The Penry Court mentioned Justice Pow-
el's standard in only one sentence, because "[s]uch a case is not before us today." Id. The Penry
Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not categorically prohibit the execution of the men-
tally retarded. Id. at 338-39. However, the Court recently overturned the jury instructions used
in Penry's conviction. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2001). The Court also noted that
the Texas legislature was considering outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. The
Court has also granted certiorari to hear the issue of the constitutionality of executing the men-
tally retarded. McCarver v. North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001); see Linda Greenhouse, Jus-
tices to Review Issue of Executing Retarded Killers, N.Y. TIMFS, March 27, 2001, at Al. The Sixth
Circuit has held that the Supreme Court's decision in McCarver will not affect the issue of exe-
cuting an insane inmate. Scott v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (6th Cir. 2001). For a discus-
sion of the issue of the mentally retarded and the death penalty, see Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death. Charting the Development of a National Con-
sensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L REV. 911, 929 (2001)
(noting that, since the first Penry decision, ten more states have banned executing the mentally
retarded, bringing the total to twelve states); see also V. Stephen Cohen, Exempting the Mentally
Retarded from the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 457 (1991); David L. Rumley, A License to KilL Te Categorical Exemption of the Men-
tally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299 (1993).
73. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Ste-
vens, JJ.) ('Since five Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furman, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgment on the narrowest grounds."); see also Scott, 250 F.3d at 1013 (holding that the
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Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice O'Connor
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's dissent that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not create a substantive right not to be executed while
insane.74 Justice O'Connor reasoned that society has a right to pun-
ish those validly convicted, and that requiring too much of a state
in determining competency after a trial creates problems of false
claims and deliberate delays. 75 She noted, however, that Florida law
had created such a protected liberty interest; thus, some minimal
procedural protections were required by due process. 76 Additionally,
because under the majority's holding a prisoner has the right to
suspend execution during a determination of incompetency, Justice
O'Connor feared that this interest in competency, by definition, can
never be conclusively and finally determined: an inmate can claim
at the very moment of execution that she has become insane since
the previous determination, no matter how recently it took place.
77
D. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
In contrast to Justice Powell's opinion in Ford, the American
Bar Association ("ABA") has suggested a much broader definition of
competency. In its Standards for Criminal Justice, the ABA states
that convicts who have been sentenced to death, but who are cur-
rently found to be mentally incompetent, should have their execu-
tion stayed. 78 The ABA Standards define competency in terms of
court was bound by Ford because neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit had ever
questioned its vitality).
74. Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the power to grant post-conviction relief to a condemned prisoner should remain in the
executive branch with the state's governor. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Solesbeo
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950)). He stated that adding an Eighth Amendment or Due Process
Clause requirement that post-conviction competency to be executed be subject to "judicial review
every time a convicted defendant suggested insanity would make the possibility of carrying out a
sentence depend upon 'fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity.'" Id. at 433
(quoting Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897)).
75. Justice O'Connor argued:
But I consider it self-evident that once society has validly convicted an individ.
ual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, the demands of duo
process are reduced accordingly. Moreover, the potential for false claims and
deliberate delay in this context is obviously enormous. This potential is exacer-
bated by a unique feature of the prisoner's protected interest in suspending the
execution of a death sentence during incompetency.
Id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 427.
77. Id. at 429 (citations omitted).
78. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 (2d ed. 1989). The ABA Standards are, of
course, not binding on courts, but are persuasive and often cited. See, e.g., Rector v. Clark, 923
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whether the convict (1) can understand the nature of the pending
proceedings, (2) can understand what he or she is being tried for,
(3) can understand the reason for the punishment, (4) can under-
stand the nature of the punishment, and (5) has sufficient capacity
to recognize and convey to his or her attorney any fact which would
make the punishment unjust or unlawful.79 The main component of
the ABA Standards not found in Justice Powells definition of com-
petency in Ford is the "assistance prong": whether the prisoner has
the ability to assist counsel in his or her defense by recognizing and
understanding any fact which might be relevant or exculpatory.8°
Several commentators have defended the inclusion of this "assis-
tance prong," and historically it has been considered part of the de-
termination of competency to be executed.81 Furthermore, Justice
Marshall has suggested that there are strong arguments for includ-
ing an assistance prong that Justice Powell erroneously overlooked
in his Ford concurrence. 82
The ABA commentary also explains that it uses the term "in-
competent," instead of the Ford Court's term "insane," to avoid con-
fusion with the use of "insanity" in the criminal context to denote
mental nonresponsibility and "beastlike derangement."8 3 Addition-
F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the ABA standards are interesting but have no legal
effect).
79. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 (2d ed. 1989). The full definition of com-
petency as outlined in the ABA Standards is as follows:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or men-
tal retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pending pro-
ceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the
nature of the punishment. A convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental
illness or mental retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize
or understand any fact which might exist which would make the punishment
unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or
to the court.
Id. The ABA, in the commentary accompanying the Standards, notes that the language of this
test was adapted from Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom. Id. at
cmt.; see Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 24 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that
due process and the "self-respect of society" requires that a defendant "should not be denied the
opportunity to inform the mind of the tribunal-be it a Governor, a board or a judge-that has to
decide between life and death, not as a matter of grace but on the basis of law. For if he be in-
sane his life cannot be forfeit except in violation of the law of the land.").
80. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 (2d ed. 1989).
81. See Harding, supra note 43, at 136.
82. Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority of
the Court denied certiorari to hear the issue. Id.
83. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 cmt (2d ed. 1989) CThe [American Bar]
Association's Standards have already rejected the use of the term 'insanity' in its more custom-
ary context of the criminal defense of mental nonresponsibility. It was rejected, in part, because
it 'conjure[s] up visions of beastlike derangement,' and because confusion results from its use in
common language as a 'lay diagnosis.' ").
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ally, the ABA includes mental retardation, which often is not asso-
ciated with the term "insane," in its definition of incompetence.8 4
Finally, the ABA makes clear that its standard is meant to stay an
execution for "any incompetence ... not just incompetence that de-
veloped subsequent to sentencing... [because of] [t]he possibility of
a defendant having a severe mental disability that was not detected
or correctly evaluated at trial."85 This notion is in direct opposition
to Justice Powell's argument in Ford against including an "assis-
tance prong" in the test for competency. 86
III. CURRENT STATES' STANDARDS
Rather than looking at every state's standard, this Note will
discuss standards in a few states that are representative of typical
state standards.87 Generally, states have adopted standards resem-
bling either Justice Powell's definition in Ford or the ABA Stan-
dards. Justice Powell's formulation of incompetency in Ford will be
termed the "single-prong" test: whether the defendant understands
why he or she was sentenced to death and comprehends this im-
pending punishment.88 The ABA Standard formulation will be
termed the "two-prong" test: including both Justice Powell's "cogni-
tive" prong and the "assistance prong" of being able to assist coun-
sel in any future proceedings.
84. Id.; cf. Penry, supra note 72.
85. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 cmt. (2d ed. 1989).
86. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
87. Several states simply have statutes that restrict executing incompetent inmates without
specifically defining the term "incompetent" or "insane." See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (2000) ('in-
sane"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3703 (West 1999) ("insane"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (2000) ("in-
sane"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406(a) (2000) ("mentally ill after conviction and sentence");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006(a) (2000) C'insane"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 61 (West 2000)
("insane"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (1999) ("mentally incompetent"); NEV. REV. STAT. 176.445
(1999) ("sane"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-6 (Michie 2000) ("insane"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2949.29 (West 2000) C'insane"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1005 (West 1999) ("defendant under
judgment of death has become insane"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-7 (1999) C'mentally ill"); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-177.1 (Michie 2000) ('mentally ill"). Some of these states have subsequently
had the terms defined by courts. See infra Part III.B. Other states have general "competent to
proceed" standards that apply to death penalty cases. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.8-112
(West 2000) C'competent to proceed"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (1999) ("fitness to proceed");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-24 (Michie 2000) ('mentally incompetent to proceed"). Some
states simply have statutes generally providing for the treatment of the mentally ill. See IND.
CODE ANN. § 11-10-4-2 (Michie 2000) ('mentally ill"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27-2(r) (West 1999)
("mental illness"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law. Co-op. 1999) C'mentally ill or mentally
retarded"). Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not currently impose the death penalty.
88. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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A. By Statute
1. Single-Prong Test
The majority of states that have statutorily defined compe-
tency to be executed have adopted definitions similar to Justice
Powell's single-prong test.89 Because it was the focus of the decision
in Ford v. Wainwright, Florida's statute, and cases applying it, will
be used as an example of such a statute. Florida law states, rather
rhetorically, that "[a] person under sentence of death shall not be
executed while insane to be executed."90 Insanity with regard to un-
dergoing execution is defined as lacking the mental capacity to un-
derstand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it.91
Some states that have adopted similar standards use the term "in-
competent" instead of "insane."
9 2
89. See ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021(B) (West 2000) C( '[M]entally incompetent to be executed'
means that due to a mental disease or defect a person who is sentenced to death is presently
unaware that he is to be punished for the crime of murder or that he is unaware that the im-
pending punishment for that crime is death."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-506(d)(1) (lichie 1999)
C[Tlhere are reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death is not
competent, due to mental illness, to understand the nature and reasons for that punishment.");
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-60 (2000) C'[The term 'mentally incompetent to be executed' means that
because of a mental condition the person is presently unable to know why he or she is being
punished and understand the nature of the punishment."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.213(2)
(Michie 2000) C 'Insane' means the condemned person does not have the ability to understand-
(a) That the person is about to be executed; and (b) Why the person is to be executed."); MD.
CODE ANN., CORRECT. SERV. § 3-904(a)(2) (2000) C" Incompetent' means the state of mind of an
inmate who, as a result of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks awareness: (i) of the
fact of the inmate's impending execution; and (ii) that the inmate is to be executed for the crime
of murder."); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 656(1) (McKinney 2001) CAn inmate is 'incompetene when,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature
and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be carried out."); TEM. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §
46.04(h) (Vernon 2001) CA defendant is incompetent to be executed if the defendant does not
understand. (1) that he or she is to be executed and that the execution is imminent; and (2) the
reason he or she is being executed."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-901(a)(v) (Michie 2000) C" 'Requi-
site mental capacity' means the ability to understand the nature of the death penalty and the
reasons it was imposed.").
90. FLA. R CRMI. P. M. 3.811(a).
91. Id. 3.811(b).
92. See, e.g., TE. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.04(h) (Vernon 2001); Exparte Jordan, 758
S.W.2d 250 (rex. Crim. App. 1988).
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2. Two-Prong Test
Two states, however, have statutorily adopted the broader
two-prong test endorsed by the ABA.93 In Mississippi, the statute
defines a convict as "insane" if he or she does not have "sufficient
intelligence to understand" the nature of the proceedings against
him or her, what he or she was tried for and the purpose of the pun-
ishment, the impending fate awaiting, and "a sufficient understand-
ing to know any fact which might exist which would make his pun-
ishment unjust or unlawful and the intelligence requisite to convey
such information to his attorneys or the court."94 Similarly, Mis-
souri law states that no person shall be condemned to death if, be-
cause of a mental illness or defect, he or she lacks the "capacity to
understand" the nature and purpose of the punishment about to be
imposed or "arguments for executive clemency or reasons why the
sentence should not be carried out."95 Additionally, two states have
used the two-prong test in their general definitions of "incompetent
to proceed," which are applied to death penalty cases as well.96
B. By Common Law
In states that lack a statutory definition of incompetence to
undergo the death penalty, courts have often provided a defini-
tion.9 7 In Van Tran v. State,98 the Tennessee Supreme Court
93. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.060(1) (West 2000).
94. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (2000); see Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 339 (5th
Cir. 1987); see also infra Part IV.C.
95. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060(1) (West 2000).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1999) C'No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or
punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference
to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable. This condition is here.
inafter referred to as 'incapacity to proceed.' "); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-2 (2000) ('[A] person is
incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting
either in: (1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against
him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or (2) his inability to consult with his
counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.").
97. See, e.g., In re Keaton, 250 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969), vacated in part, 408
U.S. 936 (1972) (defining the Ohio standard as whether the prisoner has sufficient intelligence to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what he was tried for, the purpose of his
punishment, the impending fate that awaits him, a sufficient understanding to know any fact
which might exist which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful, and the intelligence to
convey such information to his attorney or the court). In some states, federal courts have pro.
vided the definition. See, e.g., Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating
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adopted Justice Powell's "cognitive test" from Ford,9 holding that,
under Tennessee law, a prisoner is not competent to be executed if
the prisoner lacks the mental capacity to understand the fact of the
impending execution and the reason for it. 100
Conversely, in South Carolina, the state supreme court
adopted the two-prong test after noting that the General Assembly
had failed to define the level of competency required for execu-
tion. 101 The court held that the first prong was whether an inmate
can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he or she was
tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the pun-
ishment. 0 2 The second prong, according to the court, was the assis-
tance prong: whether the prisoner possesses sufficient capacity or
ability to communicate rationally with counsel. 03 The Supreme
Court of Washington has similarly adopted the two-prong test,
holding that "[w]hat is required is that they [the inmate] under-
stand they have been sentenced to death for murder and be able to
communicate rationally with counsel." 1 04 The Washington court lim-
ited the rule, however, by adding that "to be 'able to assist' in post-
conviction proceedings, the defendants need not be able to think of
new issues for counsel to raise, nor must they necessarily be able to
recall the events surrounding the crime."10 5
that because the Alabama legislature did not provide a standard for competency to be executed,
the standard given for competency to stand trial would be used because it is "sufficiently analo-
gous"); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1961) (holding that section 19.2-177.1
of the Virginia Code provided an opportunity for a prisoner to show that he is so deficient in his
faculties that it would be a denial of due process to execute him).
98. 6 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1091 (2000).
99. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
100. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266. But see id. at 275 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting)
("Noticeably absent from this [majority] criterion is any reference to the prisoner's ability to
assist counsel."). Note that some federal courts have similarly rejected the ABA Standard in
favor of Justice Powells test in Ford, even when the additional prong may have been determina-
tive to the situation at hand. See, e.g., Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991).
101. Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (S.C. 1993); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (Law.
Co-op. 1999) (providing for treatment of the mentally ill, but not specifically dealing with in-
mates sentenced to death). The Singleton court cited several older cases adopting similar views.
See People v. Geary, 131 N.E. 652 (MlL 1921); In re Grammar, 178 NAV. 624 (Neb. 1920); In re
Smith, 176 P. 819 (N.M. 1918).
102. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
103. Id.
104. Washington v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 66 (Wash. 1990).
105. Id. The court did not describe exactly how the defendant did need to be "able to assist."
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IV. APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS IN ACTUAL CASES
There are several problems with applying the standards
adopted by the states. Some of these problems have been discussed
by Justices or other judges, others asserted by commentators, and
still others will be brought forth in this Note. In order to illustrate
these problems, the factual backdrop of three specific cases will be
discussed in this part of the Note, concentrating on three states
that have recently decided the issue of competency to be exe-
cuted. 10 6 After laying out the facts and outcomes of these decisions,
Part V will discuss the problems individually, both in the abstract
and by referring back to these case studies and other judicial deci-
sions.
A. Coe v. State
In March 2000, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied
Robert Glen Coe's claim that he was incompetent to be executed.107
Coe was convicted in 1981 of the aggravated rape, aggravated kid-
napping, and first-degree murder of an eight-year-old girl.10 8 Coe
was sentenced to death, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction. 0 9 Initially, the court found that the case was ripe
because Coe's execution date was "imminent."110 Based on the sin-
gle-prong "cognitive" standard set forth in Van Tran v. State,"' the
106. This discussion will include state court decisions, as well as federal court reviews of
those decisions. See infra Part IV.A. Under an application to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to a judgment of a state court, the federal court will only grant the writ if the
state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1994). Thus, when a
federal court is reviewing a state court's finding that a person is competent to be executed, sub-
stantial deference is given to the state court's ruling. For discussion on the issue of "second or
successive" habeas corpus petitions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, see
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 639-46 (1998). But see Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note,
A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115, 1127-35 (1998) (arguing that there may be constitu-
tional problems with the Act).
107. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 230 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000). Coe's sub-
sequent petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied at both the district and appellate levels.
See Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 828 (6th Cir. 2000); Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922, 944 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000).
108. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 199.
109. State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
110. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 200. Coe's execution date was set for March 23, 2000, and the state
supreme court's decision was filed on March 6, 2000. Id. at 193, 200.
111. 6 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tenn. 1999).
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court then reviewed whether Coe lacked the mental capacity to un-
derstand the fact of his impending execution and the reason for
it.112 The factual basis for the review was the competency hearing
that had been ordered by the trial judge."i 3 The testimony of the
four mental health experts appointed by the trial judge, two for
each side, were discussed in detail in the opinion." 4
Coe's first expert witness was James Ray Merikangas, M.D.,
whom the trial court accepted as an expert witness in the fields of
neurology, neuropsychiatry, and psychiatry." 5 Dr. Merikangas
based his testimony on a review of appellant's records, a physical
examination of the appellant, a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
test revealing brain abnormalities, and a positron emission tomo-
gram (PET) scan of appellant's brain." 6 His personal contact with
Coe consisted of a single visit for a total of ninety minutes. 17 In Dr.
Merikangas's opinion, Coe had congenital brain damage," i8 malde-
velopment, and probably some acquired brain damage." 9 He diag-
nosed Coe as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, 120 and found in his
112. Id.; see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
113. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 200. The standard for granting a competency hearing in Tennessee
was set forth in Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269. An inmate is required to make a threshold showing
that her competency to be executed is at issue. Id. In Coe u. State, the state supreme court at-
tached as an appendix the trial coures order describing the hearing and finding appellant compe-
tent to be executed. 17 S.W.3d 193. It should be noted that, consistent with Justice Powells
opinion in Ford, Van Tran requires appellant to bear the burden of proof on the issue of compe-
tency to be executed. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. Coe, 17 SAV.3d at 200. The trial court also relied on the report of Dr. Herbert Meltzer
that Coe was aware of his imminent execution and the nature of his crimes. Id. at 206. Finally,
several lay witnesses testified as to specific instances of unusual conduct by Coe, though none
offered an opinion as to his present mental competency to be executed. Id. at 206-07.
115. Id. at 200. Dr. Merikangas was a licensed physician, board certified in both psychiatry
and neurology, as well as a lecturer in psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine and
practitioner of neuropsychiatry in Connecticut. Id. "Neurology" is "the science of the structure
and functioning of the nervous system." J.P. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 302 (2d ed.
1985). "Neuropsychiatry" is "a medical specialty that deals with neurological and psychiatric
disorders." Id. at 303. "Psychiatry" is "the specialized branch of medicine dealing with the diag-
nosis, treatment, and prevention of mental disorders." Id. at 362.
116. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 201.
117. Id.
118. "Congenital brain damage" is brain damage which originated at the time of birth or dur-
ing fetal development. CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 99.
119. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 201.
120. "Schizophrenia" is "a general name for a group of psychotic reactions characterized by
withdrawal, disturbances in emotional and affective life, and depending on the type, the presence
of hallucinations, delusions, negativistic behavior, and progressive deterioration" CHAPLIN,
supra note 115, at 409. "Paranoid schizophrenia" is "a form of schiozphrenia [sic] in which the
chief symptom is delusions of persecution or of grandeur. There are also disturbances of think-
ing, hallucinations, and deterioration." Id. at 324. "Chronic" means "pertaining to diseases and
mental disorders of slow onset and long duration." Id. at 81.
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interview that Coe had delusions, 121 hallucinations, peculiarities of
thinking, and disorders of movement. 122 According to Dr. Merikan-
gas, Coe was not malingering, 123 and the conclusion by the state's
mental health experts that Coe was malingering was based on
"junk science."1
24
Under the Van Tran single-prong standard, Dr. Merikangas
admitted that Coe was "aware" that he was going to be executed
and knew why he was sentenced to die. 125 However, he emphasized
that, in his opinion, there is a distinction, between "awareness" and
"understanding," opining that appellant's belief that he would be
reincarnated after death 126 demonstrated that he did not fully "un-
derstand" the consequence of death. 27 Thus, Dr. Merikangas found
Coe incompetent to be executed. 128 Furthermore, in his opinion, Coe
would become even less competent as the time of his execution drew
near. 129 On cross-examination, Dr. Merikangas stated that he based
his finding of incompetency on the fact that Coe was a paranoid
schizophrenic, although he admitted that one could be schizo-
phrenic and still be competent to be executed.
180
The second expert to testify on behalf of Coe was Dr. William
Davis Kenner III, who was accepted by the trial court as an expert
in the field of psychiatry. 131 Dr. Kenner based his testimony on four
121. A "delusion" is "a false belief that cannot be modified by reasoning or a demonstration of
facts." Id. at 120.
122. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 201. For example, Dr. Merikangas noted Coe's decision to stay in his
cell rather than exercise, his past "wild" conduct, his nicotine addiction, his tendency to drink a
lot of coffee, and his pariphilia (tendency to masturbate in public). Id.
123. "Malingering" means "feigning illness or disability, usually for the purpose of escaping
responsibility or unpleasant duty." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 265.
124. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 201. By "junk science," Dr. Merikangas presumably meant that the
methods used were not accurate or acceptable by the scientific community. On cross-
examination, Dr. Merikangas admitted that Dr. Richard Rogers, one of the foremost experts in
the United States on malingering, considers the tests that the state experts used as valid means
for determining malingering. Id.
125. Id.
126. These beliefs were apparently based on those of writer and philosopher Edgar Cayco. Id.
Dr. Daryl Bruce Matthews, an expert witness for the State, described Edgar Cayce as "a famous
American prophet and fake healer who died in the nineteen forties, and who has written scores
of books and sold millions of copies of said books." Id. at 240 n.66. Coe said that he had not based
his ideas on Cayce, but that Cayce essentially echoed his views. Id. at 240.




131. Id. Dr. Kenner was licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee, employed on the clinical
faculty at Vanderbilt University Medical School, and had a private general psychiatry practice.
Id.
2460
2001] THE COMPETENCY CONUNDRUM 2461
separate personal interviews. 132 After the first visit, Dr. Kenner
found Coe to be schizophrenic and incompetent. 33 After the second
interview, however, Dr. Kenner found Coe competent because he
was no longer exhibiting psychotic symptoms. 134 At the third inter-
view, Coe did not remember the second visit, which had occurred
the previous night. 135 Besides this memory loss, Coe told a story
about his childhood completely inconsistent with the history he had
given previously. 136 Furthermore, Coe became agitated when asked
about the death penalty and asked to be returned to his cell. 37
Based on this third visit, Dr. Kenner began to suspect that
Coe suffered from dissociative identity disorder ("DID").'13 At the
fourth interview, Dr. Kenner discovered that another inmate had
threatened Coe prior to the third interview, and concluded that the
stress from this threat had caused the period of separate identity he
had observed. 139 Dr. Kenner also diagnosed Coe as suffering from
generalized anxiety disorder, 140 schizoaffective disorder (bipolar
type 41), poly-substance abuse, learning disorder, reading disorder,
and schizoid personality disorder' 42 with antisocial features. 143 Dr.
132. Id. These interviews took place on December 22, 1999, and January 10. 11, and 12,
2000. Id.
133. Id. Dr. Kenner's sworn affidavit based on this first interview was the basis for the trial
courts finding that Coe had made a threshold showing of incompetency, and thus was entitled to
a competency hearing. Id.
134. Id. at 202. "Psychosis" is "a severe mental disorder characterized by disorganization of
the thought processes, disturbances in emotionality, disorientation as to time, space, and person,
and, in some cases, hallucinations and delusions." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 375.
135. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 202. As the interview ended, Coe indicated that he was going to call
his attorney to find out if the previous night's interview had actually taken place. Id.
136. Id. Neither the state supreme coures opinion nor the appendix containing the Criminal
Court of Tennessee for the Thirteenth Judicial District's findings of fact describe this story or the
previous one. Coe was apparently subjected to sexual abuse by his father. See Coe v. Bell, 89 F.
Supp. 2d 922, 930 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
137. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 202.
138. Id. DID was previously known as multiple personality disorder. Id. According to Dr.
Kenner, a person suffering from DID has both a primary and secondary identity. Id. When the
secondary identity is manifested, it "has no awareness of the primary identity, any of the pri-
mary identity's past history, why he is on death row, what is about to happen to him, anything
like that." Id. The trial court noted that Dr. Kenner did not explain how Coe's "secondary iden-
tity" was aware of the names of the attorneys representing his "primary identity." Id. at 203.
139. Id. at 202.
140. In psychology, "anxiety" means a "feeling of mingled dread and apprehension about the
future without specific cause for the fear." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 31.
141. "Bipolar" means "having branches arising from both ends of a cell body, as bipolar neu-
rons ... [or] characterizing traits that can be expressed as opposites, such as dominance and
submission." Id. at 56.
142. A "personality disorder" is "a difficulty in social adjustment that is not as serious as
neurosis or psychosis but includes inadequacies in motivational and emotional processes." Id. at
334. "Schizoid" simply means pertaining to schizophrenia. Id. at 409.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Kenner also found Coe not to be malingering and questioned the
effectiveness of the tests used by the state's experts to find that he
was malingering.14 Explaining the effect of DID on his diagnosis,
Dr. Kenner explained that Coe's condition would vacillate depend-
ing on stress levels, so that he may be competent on a good day, but
incompetent on a bad day. 145 In Dr. Kenner's opinion, to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty, the stress from the approaching
execution date would cause Coe to dissociate, rendering him incom-
petent to be executed. 146 On cross-examination, Dr. Kenner admit-
ted that, at the time of his fourth interview, Coe was competent to
be executed under the Van Tran single-prong standard.147
The State's first expert witness was Daryl Bruce Matthews,
M.D., Ph.D., whom the trial court accepted as an expert in the field
of forensic psychiatry. 148 Dr. Matthews reviewed Coe's detailed psy-
chiatric history and conducted a five-hour psychiatric evaluation of
him.149 Coe told Dr. Matthews that he knew the difference between
life and death and believed he had a soul that would go somewhere
after death. 150 After noting that Coe had already chosen a method of
execution,151 Dr. Matthews recounted that when he asked Coe what
happened upon a finding of incompetence, Coe said, "[Tihey give
you drugs to make you well and then they kill you."15 2 Dr. Matthews
concluded that Coe was aware of why he was convicted, although he
minimized the seriousness of the offense and continued to profess
his innocence. 153 Dr. Matthews diagnosed Coe as suffering from
pariphilia, 54 poly-substance dependence in a controlled environ-
143. See Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 202. "Antisocial personality" means "a behavioral disorder charac-
terized by truancy, delinquency, promiscuity, theft, vandalism, fighting, violation of common
social rules, poor work record, impulsiveness, irrationality, aggressiveness, reckless behavior,
and inability to plan ahead." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 31.
144. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 202.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 203.
148. Id. Dr. Matthews was licensed to practice medicine in Hawaii and Arkansas, board cer.
tified in psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, and a clinical professor of psychiatry at Hawaii
School of Medicine. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Coe chose the method of lethal injection with a needle. Id.
152. Id.
153. Coe minimized the offense by stating that people get murdered all the time, and claimed
that the crime was actually committed by a man named Donald Gant. Id. He further claimed
that his confession had been coerced. Id.
154. See supra note 122.
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ment, adjustment disorder 55 with mixed anxiety and depressed
mood, nicotine dependence, malingering, possible neuroleptic-
induced Parkinsonism, 156 noncompliance with medical treatment,
antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and
schizotypal personality disorder. 157 After disagreeing with any di-
agnosis of Coe as schizophrenic or suffering from DID, Dr. Mat-
thews found Coe competent to be executed under Van Tran.58 On
cross-examination, Dr. Matthews admitted that he had never
treated a patient with DID, and that he was skeptical that the dis-
order existed at all.159 Dr. Matthews also admitted that Coe could
possibly become psychotic in the future.160
The State's second expert, Daniel A. Martell, Ph.D., was ac-
cepted by the trial court as an expert in the field of psychology.
61
Dr. Martell based his testimony on nine and one-half hours of in-
terviewing and testing over two days, as well as a review of many
documents pertaining to Coe.1 62 During the interview, Dr. Martell
found Coe to be oriented to the world around him, able to describe
accurately his own identity, location, and the month and year.'3 Dr.
Martell also found that Coe expressed his thoughts coherently and
logically, although he appeared paranoid at times.164 Coe denied
having visual hallucinations, but claimed to have experienced both
auditory and olfactory hallucinations. 65 Dr. Martell found that Coe
was malingering mental illness, based on some psychological tests
155. An "adjustment disorder" involves a problem with varying one's behavior in order to
overcome a barrier and satisfy one's needs. CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 12.
156. Neuroleptic-Induced Parkinsonism is a motor disorder that can be caused by particular
medications used to treat mental disorders. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATIsTIcAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 792 (4th ed., rev. text 2000). "The essential feature
ofNeuroleptic-Induced Parkinsonism is the presence of parkinsonian signs or symptoms... that
develop in associations with the use of neuroleptic medications." Id. Parkinson's disease is "a
neurological disorder characterized by rigidity, tremor, and difficulty in controlling movements
CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 325.
157. Coe, 17 SAV.3d at 203-04.
158. Id. at 204. In disputing the schizophrenia diagnosis, Dr. Matthews cited the lack of de-
lusional thoughts and the diagnosis of Coe by Dr. Herbert Meltzer. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Dr. Martell was licensed to practice psychology in New York and California and
board certified in forensic psychology and neuropsychology. Id. "Psychology' is "the science of
human and animal behavior; the study of the organism in all its variety and complexity as it
responds to the flux and flow of the physical and social events that make up the environment.L"
CHAPIJN, supra note 115, at 367. Compare this definition with that of "psychiatry." Id. at 362.
162. Coe, 17 S.W.Sd at 204. Dr. Martelrs testing took place on January 8 and 9, 2000. Id.
163. Id. Coe was not sure of the exact day of the month. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The distinction is between hallucinations pertaining to hearing (auditory) and those
pertaining to the sense of smell (olfactory). See Chaplin, supra note 115, at 42, 313.
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he administered. 166 In his opinion, Coe was competent to be exe-
cuted under Van Tran.167 He found that Coe understood he was go-
ing to die and knew the reason why he was sentenced to die, al-
though he continued to profess his innocence.168
Coe then called two rebuttal witnesses, Dr. John Pruett and
Dr. James Walker. 169 Dr. Pruett was the attending physician at
Riverbend Maximum Security Institution from 1994 to 1997 and
had seen Coe every two or three months during that time. 170 Dr.
Pruett testified that Dr. Kenner's observations of Coe's changes in
behavior were consistent with DID, but did not offer his own opin-
ion as to Coe's present mental competency to be executed. 171 Dr.
Walker was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic neuropsy-
chology and had examined Coe over two days, giving the same bat-
tery of tests as Dr. Martell. 72 Although the tests produced similar
results, Dr. Walker did not find Coe to be malingering, especially
because he took every available opportunity to deny he had any
psychosis. 173 Dr. Walker would not diagnose Coe with DID, but rec-
ognized all of the other mental health experts' diagnoses as reason-
able. 74 Although he refused to express an opinion about whether
Coe met the Van Tran standard for competency, 175 he admitted that
Coe was aware of his impending execution and why it had been im-
posed on him. 176 Dr. Walker disagreed with Dr. Kenner's assertion
166. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 204. On cross-examination, the validity of those tests was attacked,
and Dr. Martell admitted that some of the questions asked were not appropriate for a death row
inmate, although he defended the outcome of the tests taken as a whole. Id.
167. Id.; see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
168. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 204-05. As part of the basis of this understanding, Dr. Martell noted
that Coe chose lethal injection as the method of execution, and refused the prison officiars offer
to give him Valium to sedate him prior to execution, saying, "I think there might be a God, and
I've got enough to deal with him, without being drunk on Valium." Id. at 205.
169. Dr. Pruett was board certified in psychiatry and licensed as a psychiatrist in Tennessee;
Dr. Walker was a clinical assistant professor of neurology at Vanderbilt University School of
Medicine and licensed to practice psychology in Tennessee. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Dr. Pruett also testified that DID is a legitimately recognized mental disorder, al-
though he had only seen one patient with the disorder in the past. Id.
172. Id.
173. Dr. Walker found that Coe's exaggerations invalidated the tests, but that there was no
requisite motivation to avoid execution and consciously lie to qualify for malingering. Id. at 205-
06.
174. Id. at 206.
175. Dr. Walker would not make a diagnosis of competency to be executed because he stated
that such a diagnosis was not his expertise. Id.
176. Id.
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that Coe's mental-state would deteriorate as the execution date ap-
proached.17
Although he did not testify, Coe's own behavior at the com-
petency hearing consisted of inappropriate comments to the judge
78
and other court personnel, 7 9 as well as generally disruptive behav-
ior.180 After screaming obscene and profane comments and threats
in the courtroom and spitting at the Assistant Attorney General,
Coe was gagged, and, when that proved ineffective, eventually re-
moved from the courtroom.' 8 ' The trial judge noted that throughout
these tirades, Coe was obviously aware of his situation, and even
interjected his own logical and coherent responses to questions
asked of witnesses.18 2 In particular, Coe repeatedly warned the trial
judge that whatever he ruled would be overturned at the federal
level, showing an awareness of his impending execution and legal
situation.183
After comparing the vastly different opinions of all of these
expert witnesses, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the evi-
dence fully supported the trial court's finding that Coe was pres-
ently competent to be executed because he was aware of his im-
pending death and the reasons for it.184 The court affirmed the trial
177. Id.
178. For example, after Coe had banged on chairs with his hands, the court instructed bail-
iffs to place him in a chair made of softer material Id. at 236. At that point, Coe told his attor-
neys, "Make a note of that. When we appeal it. Take his ass off that bench." Id. Then, Coe ad-
dressed the court, again banging on the chair, and said, "How do you like that? Can.you hear
that, Judge? Just happen to have one here I can beat on. How's that, Judge" Id. Later, Coe told
the court, "You'll regret bringing me down here you goddam Judge Judy want to be." Id. at 237.
179. The criminal court findings of fact described that Coe's screaming in the court room
"consisted of obscenities and threats, directed at the Court, the court clerk, the capital case law
clerk, the State's attorneys, the witness, and the court reporter." Id.
180. Id. at 207. The best example of this behavior occurred when Sergeant James W. Horton,
a guard at Riverbend where Coe was housed, took the stand. When Sergeant Horton was ques-
tioned about his job, Coe shouted, "He wasn't a goddam thing. He was a whore." Id. at 237. Coe
then told Sergeant Horton, "Just remember you got to be back at River Bend [sic] whore. You
won't have all these gooddamn [sic] people protecting you [sic] ass up there, bitch... Don't be
trying to hide, you punk...." Id.
181. Id. at 207. Once removed from the courtroom, Coe made no more outbursts. Id. at 239.
182. Id. at 207.
183. Id. Coe specifically claimed that "Judge Nixon is going to overturn anything that punk
says," referring by name to the federal district court judge who had ten days earlier allowed Coe
to pursue his competency to be executed claim in federal court after the conclusion of the state
court hearing. Id.
184. Id. at 230. Justice Birch filed a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with Tennessee's compe-
tency standards under Van Tran and expressing his opinion that the Coe should be granted a
stay of execution. Id. at 248-49 (Birch, J., dissenting). Justice Birch argued for inclusion of an
assistance prong in the test for competency to be executed. Id. at 248.
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court's decision, and directed the Warden of the Riverbend Maxi-
mum Security Institution to carry out Coe's execution.
8 5
B. Provenzano v. State
In May 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Proven-
zano v. State,186 affirming the circuit court's finding that Proven-
zano was competent to be executed under Florida's single-prong
"cognitive test." 18 7 The circuit court had held an evidentiary hearing
on Provenzano's competency to be executed, which was the basis of
the appeal. 88 The court had found that Provenzano had a delu-
sional belief that he was Jesus Christ and had "mental health prob-
lems of some degree."'189 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court
agreed with the circuit court that Provenzano "[did] not lack the
mental capacity to understand the fact of his pending execution and
the reason for it."190 One justice dissented, noting that the circuit
judge found that Provenzano did not rationally accept the reasons
for his execution, but that such acceptance was not required for
competency to be executed. 191 The dissent noted that this case went
further, however, because Provenzano's rejection of the reasons for
his execution was based on a delusional belief.192 Provenzano was
185. Id. at 230. The court set the execution date for March 23, 2000. Id. This date was almost
seventeen years after the original execution date set by the Tennessee Supreme Court the first
time it considered Coe's conviction for murder. See State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903, 913 (Tenn.
1983). Subsequent to the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in March 2000, Coe filed an appli-
cation for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, which stayed the execution pending a ruling on the habeas claim. See Coe v. Bell, 89
F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). After the district court denied this application, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court set Coe's execution for April 5, 2000. See Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 251
(Tenn. 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit then granted a stay of execution in order
to hear fully the merits of Coe's habeas claim. See Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied Coe's petition. Id. at 248. Coe was executed by lethal
injection on April 19, 2000, Tennessee's first execution in forty years. See Jay Hamburg et al.,
Coe Executed; Tennessee Carries Out First Death Penalty in 40 Years as Girl's Killer Dies by
Injection, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 19, 2000, at Al.
186. 760 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (2000).
187. Id.; see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
188. Provenzano, 760 So. 2d at 139. Actually, the state supreme court had remanded the
case, ordering an evidentiary hearing, and then again remanded the case to allow Provenzano
another evidentiary hearing with more witnesses. Id. These competency hearings were held
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812.
189. Id. at 140.
190. Id. The supreme court, citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford, held that "the
Eighth Amendment only requires that defendants be aware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it." Id.




found to believe that the reason for his execution was not because
he murdered another human being, but because he was Jesus
Christ.193 According to the dissent, Provenzano was unable to con-
nect his execution to the crime of which he was convicted, so he
should have been held incompetent to be executed. 194
This case is illustrative of the extent to which an inmate can
have mental health problems, and even delusions, but still be found
competent to be executed based on current standards. 195 It also dis-
plays the degree to which competent and fair judges can disagree on
just how competent an inmate must be in order to be executed. 96
C. Billiot v. State
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's
finding that an inmate was competent to be executed under the
state's two-prong test in Billiot v. State.197 James E. Bilhiot was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. 198 The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that Billiot was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether he was competent to be executed.199
After eight different expert witnesses testified at this hearing, the
trial court found BilHiot competent to be executed. 200
At the competency hearing, Billiot first called Dr. Donald
Guild, a psychiatrist who had examined Billiot seven months before
the hearing, as an adverse witness. 201 Dr. Guild did not make a de-
finitive diagnosis, but found Billiot was not psychotic or suffering
from paranoid schizophrenia. 20 2 Still, Dr. Guild concluded that Bil-
Hot met the criteria for anti-social personality disorder.203 He found
193. Id. (citing the circuit judge's order). Justice Anstead continued that: "In other words we
have a judicial finding that Provenzano not only has long suffered from a serious mental illness,
but also that Provenzanos illness has caused him to be out of touch with reality in that he has
long believed he is Jesus Christ and he is being put to death because of who he is, not because of
anything he did." Id.
194. Id. at 143.
195. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
197. 655 So. 2d 1, 18 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1095 (1996). It should be noted that
Mississippi uses the two-prong test for competency to be executed, in which an inmate must
understand the nature of the punishment and be able to assist his or her counsel. See MIss
CODE. ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (2000); supra note 94 and accompanying text.
198. Billiot, 655 So. 2d at 2.
199. Id. The competency hearing took place in 1988. Id. The trial court determined compe-
tency based on MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57(2)(b) and Ford u. Wainwright. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
200. Billiot, 655 So. 2d at 2, 4-10.
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Billiot was in touch with reality at that time, but stated that com-
petency is time dependent: "It does not mean that he could not have
been crazy in the past or in the future .... [A] man can be compe-
tent one time and then three months later, it's very possible that he
will become incompetent."204 Dr. Guild testified as to the specific
criteria upon which he relied in making his determination, includ-
ing whether Billiot understood the reason why he was being exe-
cuted. 2 5 Another psychologist, Dr. Charlton S. Stanley, had exam-
ined Billiot along with Dr. Guild and was also called by Billiot as an
adverse witness. 206 Although he agreed with Dr. Guild that compe-
tency is perishable, Dr. Stanley found Billiot competent to be exe-
cuted.20 7 Dr. Stanley stated that, in order to be competent to be exe-
cuted, the prisoner must understand his impending fate and "un-
derstand the finality of that; that you can't have some sort of crazy
idea that they can't kill you." 208
Bilhiot next called Dr. Robert L. McKinley, a psychiatrist
who had examined Billiot several times. 209 After his second exami-
nation in 1987, Dr. McKinley stated in a report that "[Billiot] defi-
nitely has beyond the shadow of a doubt a chronic schizophrenic
204. Id.
205. Id. Specifically, Dr. Guild asked:
One, does he know what he's facing? Does he know why he's seeing me? Does he
know the purpose of the hearing? Can he communicate with his attorney effec-
tively in the hearing, for whatever purpose it is? Does he know he's been con-
victed? Does he know what he's been convicted of? Does he have an understand.
ing of his legal defense and recourses? Does he understand that he's gonna be
executed and the finality of death? Does he understand the reason that he's be-
ing executed, the reason that he was sentenced? Does he have a comprehension
of that? Does he have a comprehension of the facts or an ability to comprehend
any facts that might save him, that might mitigate or change his status?
Id.
206. Id. Dr. Stanley had rendered opinions about the competency of three other individuals
to be executed in the past, finding them all competent. Id. With Biliot, Dr. Stanley's opinion was
based on one interview as well as appellant's prior history Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. In order to be competent to be executed, Dr. Stanley stated that
You've got to be able to understand that you've been charged with a capital
crime. That you are liable to execution. That you have to understand that a
death sentence means that; that you are to be killed. And you are to understand
the finality of that; that you can't have some sort of crazy idea that they can't
kill you. You have to understand the purpose for which society deems your
death necessary. That's paraphrasing, but I think that hits the-the major
points. And if, because of some delusional or insane belief system that you can't
meet those criteria, then you would not be competent to be executed. And-oh
yeah. You've got to be able-if you think of a mitigating ... circumstance at
the last minute that you can communicate effectively with your attorney or
someone. For an example would be to remember a witness at the last moment
that.., says that you didn't do it. I think I hit them all.
Id.
209. Id. at 4-5.
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disorder."210 At an examination -a year later, Dr. McKinley pre-
scribed for Billiot a second anti-psychotic, anti-schizophrenic
medication "to calm down his nerves."211 At the time of the hearing,
Dr. McKinley maintained that Billiot was unquestionably schizo-
phrenic, but would not render an opinion as to his competency to be
executed because he would want to evaluate Billiot on the day of
the hearing to make such a finding. 212 He emphasized that indi-
viduals with schizophrenia can have their thinking rapidly change,
because the disease "is characterized by exacerbation and remis-
sions or relapses and remissions."213 Dr. McKinley admitted that
someone can be a paranoid schizophrenic and still be competent to
be executed, but also emphasized that during periodic remissions of
the illness, a person can appear totally normal.21 4
Next, Billiot called Dr. Michael Whelan, the director of the
Department of Psychiatry at Parchman. 2 5 Dr. Whelan performed a
battery of tests on Billiot in the hospital in 1984 and had visited
Billiot sporadically while he was on death row.216 In his report fol-
lowing the tests, Dr. Whelan found Billiot to have symptoms of de-
lusion of reference, 217 delusions of grandiosity,2 8 nihilism, 219 and
210. Id. at 5. At this time, Dr. McKinley prescribed Mellaril, an anti-psychotic drug, for Bil-
liot. Id.
211. Id. Dr. McKinley stated that with this second drug, Trilafon, "[tihe symptoms of schizo-
phrenia can be brought under control within four weeks to where they are not present, or at least
not as intense or as frequent. However, the individual still has schizophrenia." Id.
212. Id. Dr. McKinley testified that he had not seen Billiot since February 1988, and would
want to examine him on the day of the hearing "because schizophrenics are very ambivalent-
their thinking can rapidly turn." Id. Dr. McKinley added that to determine competency at the
time of the hearing "he would want to supplement his clinical interviews with psychological
evaluation, including testing-a brain scan, maybe an EEG." Id. An "EEG" is an electroencepha-
logram, which is "a graphic record of the electrical currents developed by the cerebral cortex."
CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 150.
213. Biliot, 655 So. 2d at 5.
214. Id. Dr. McKinley also stated that some of the drugs that Billiot admitted to taking (co-
caine, speed, downers, LSD, PCP, marijuana) could result in a condition that mimics schizophre-
nia if taken in high doses over a long period of time. Id. at 6. He also stated, however, that drug
abuse can be a contributing factor along with schizophrenia to incompetency. Id. Dr. McKinley
further testified that a man of normal intelligence might still be incompetent to be executed if he
is "unable to appreciate the significance between the act for which he was convicted and the
execution he will suffer because of the conviction." Id.
215. Id. Billiot was examined several times at Parchman, including the examinations by Dr.
McKinley. Id. at 5-6.
216. Id. at 6.
217. "Delusion of reference" is "a false belief that the behavior of others has malign signifi-
cance for the self." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 121. The Billiot court described it as occurring
when a person attaches a particular significance to some event in his or her life that is clearly
irrational or out of touch with reality. 655 So. 2d at 6.
218. "Delusions of grandeur" is "the belief, usually psychotic, that one is a great or powerful
person." CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 120.
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persecutory content.220 Dr. Whelan stated that Billiot was "firmly
entrenched in a delusional system which [permitted] him to
acknowledge the fact that he did indeed murder the Croll family,
but which [permitted] an absolution of his guilt."221 Dr. Whelan also
testified that the day before the hearing, he heard Billiot mention,
while talking to Dr. McKinley, "something about demons and the
devil overthrowing the kingdom and that he had been an angel.
' 222
Dr. Whelan found Billiot competent to be executed in 1985, but
would not render an opinion at the hearing without having exam-
ined Billiot within a few days of the hearing. 223 Dr. Whelan admit-
ted on cross-examination that at the time of his last interview with
Billiot, he found that Billiot understood his sentence and compre-
hended the finality of death. 224 Furthermore, he found that Billiot
was in touch with reality because he did not think he had any spe-
cial powers that would prevent the state from executing him.225 Fi-
nally, Dr. Whelan stated that Bilhiot's condition was subject to
change and that if he became "floridly psychotic," 226 he could be in-
competent for execution. 22
7
Billiot then called Dr. William Johnson, a professor of psy-
chiatry at the University Medical Center, who interviewed Billiot
around the same time as Dr. Guild and Dr. Stanley.228 Dr. Johnson,
however, found that Billiot was not competent to be executed be-
cause he could not make a connection between his role in the crime
and what the state had decided to do to him.229 He also testified
219. In psychology, nihilism is characterized by a belief that the existing order of things has
disappeared. Id. at 304.
220. Bifliot, 655 So. 2d at 6. Dr. Whelan's report was very detailed because he had prepared
it as a work sample to be submitted to the American Board of Forensic Psychology. Id.
221. Id. Dr. Whelan also testified that, although Billiot comprehended his crime, his judg-
ment was impaired because he thought his crime was "not that bad-it was just a family dis.
pute." Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 6. Dr. Whelan also stated in his report that, after an incident where Billiot was
stabbed in prison, the security staff noted that Billiot "was constantly talking to demons and
spirits throughout the night." Id. at 7.
223. Id. Dr. Whelan testified that he did not know if Billiot was still entrenched in a dolu.
sional state at the time of the hearing because he had not had an opportunity to examine him.
Id. at 6. He then stated that "he would prefer to extensively examine Billiot within a few days of
the hearing on the question of his competency before he would feel comfortable giving an opinion
on the issue." Id. at 7.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. By "floridly psychotic," Dr. Whelan presumably meant that the symptoms of psychosis
had begun to display themselves.
227. Id.
228. Id. The court recognized Dr. Johnson as an expert witness. Id.
229. Id. at 8.
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that he had seen Billiot for one half-hour the morning before the
hearing and found him still incompetent to be executed, as he was
unaware of the proceedings against him-Billiot thought he could
still plead not guilty to the crime.20 Dr. Johnson testified that Bil-
hot thought the execution would not succeed "due to his powers and
so on."2'2 Specifically, Dr. Johnson stated that Billiot knew that he
was found guilty of capital murder and was sentenced to die, but
that he typically could not relate the sentence to the crime.2 2 Ac-
cording to Dr. Johnson, Billiot sometimes denied committing the
crime and thought he could still plead not guilty, while at other
times he admitted to the murders, but said "there was an omen go-
ing around and that he had no choice but to commit the crime." m
Dr. Johnson found Billiot to be schizophrenic and suffering from
delusions: "[H]e can take on the identities of other individuals,
whether it be Jesus Christ, Pancho Villa or Lucifer, Attila the Hun,
Julius Caesar, Napoleon. 234 Finally, Dr. Johnson testified that
someone suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with psychosis is
not competent to be executed, while a paranoid schizophrenic with-
out psychosis may or may not be competent to be executed. 235 The
distinction apparently was based on the fact that psychosis is con-
sidered a more severe mental impairment, especially when coupled
with schizophrenia. 23 6
The State first called Dr. Henry A. Maggio, who had exam-
ined Billiot in 1982, finding him competent to stand trial, and in
1988, finding him competent to be executed.2 7 Dr. Maggio admitted
that he conducted no formal psychological testing in determining
that Bilhiot was not paranoid schizophrenic.m He also agreed that
schizophrenia fluctuates; thus, competency to be executed may
230. Id. Dr. Johnson stated: "Billiot does not have a rational understanding of the proceed-
ings ... he does not understand the-he knows what he was tried for in a factual sense, but
rationally he can't connect what he was tried for and.., the penalty and his actions. He can't




234. Id. After stating that he did not think Billiot was malingering, Dr. Johnson noted that
an overwhelming majority of his testimony in the past had supported the state, having testified
for the defendant at a competency hearing only one other time. Id. Dr. Johnson admitted on
cross-examination that he is philosophically opposed to the death penalty, but maintained that it
does not interfere with his clinical analysis. Id. at 9.
235. Id. For medical definitions of "schizophrenia" and "psychosis," see supra notes 120, 134.
236. See supra note 134.




come and go. 239 The State then called Dr. Guild back to the stand,
who stated that, in his opinion, Bilijot was clearly competent to be
executed when Dr. Guild interviewed him in 1988.240 As proof that
Billiot was in touch with reality, Dr. Guild emphasized that, when
asked to choose between forms of execution, Biliot could not choose
and "was able to joke about it a little. 241 Dr. Guild also found it
very significant that Dr. Whelan had never actually seen Billiot in a
"floridly psychotic" state. 42 Finally, the State called Dr. Stanley
back to the stand to testify that Billiot's scores on the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory Profile Test indicated character-
istics of anti-social personality disorder, not paranoid schizophre-
nia.243 He also testified that Billiot in his interview admitted to not
having any special powers. 244 Dr. Stanley found Billiot competent to
be executed, but admitted on cross-examination that competency is
perishable and fluid.
245
The Mississippi Supreme Court found Billiot competent to be
executed, noting that the only expert finding him presently incom-
petent was Dr. Johnson. 246 The court found persuasive the fact that
several experts conducting examinations at differing times over
several years each had reached the same conclusion. 247 The court
did note, however, that Dr. Johnson had completed more recent and
more extensive research on the issue of Billiot's insanity, and had
found him incompetent.2 48
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. Dr. Guild also thought that Billiot was malingering. Id. Furthermore, he distin-
guished ability to assist counsel from willingness to assist counsel, so that Billiot's uncooperative
behavior with his attorney at times was not significant. Id. at 9.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Dr. Stanley thought Billiot was malingering, but also admitted that appellant did
not claim to feel insane in his interview. Id.
245. Id. Dr. Stanley noted that an eleventh hour examination had been done on another
death row inmate to ensure competency. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. According to the court, his factor was not sufficient to meet the requirement that the
trial courts post-conviction ruling only be reversed if appellant can prove that it is against the
overwhelming weight of evidence or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 12.
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V. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT
STANDARDS
A. Multiple Examinations and 'Ymminence"
In her dissent in Ford v. Wainwright,24 9 Justice O'Connor
pointed out one major problem with applying the rule against exe-
cuting an incompetent person: "Regardless of the number of prior
adjudications of the issue, until the very moment of execution the
prisoner can claim that he has become insane sometime after the
previous determination to the contrary."20 Justice O'Connor feared
the potential for false claims and deliberate delays because the
prisoner could suspend execution during an incompetency hearing,
despite the fact that he or she was already validly convicted and
sentenced under the law.
251
249. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
250. Id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Hazard & Lousell, supra note 36, at 399-
400). Justice Rehnquist echoed similar concerns in his dissent. Supra note 74; see also Martin v.
Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1560 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing
to resolve the issue of competency); State v. Scott, 746 N.E.2d 1124, 1126 (Ohio 2001) (Pfeifer, J.,
concurring) C'Wainwright clearly states that the insane may not be executed, but it is unclear
when the determination of sanity must be made.").
251. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429. Justice O'Connor recognized the "very great" interest of the pris-
oner in avoiding an erroneous determination, but thought the procedures established by the
majority were excessive. Id. A related question outside the scope of this Note is the issue of drug-
induced competency to be executed, with its myriad of medical ethics problems. See Singleton v.
Norris, No. 00-1492, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21770, at *30 (8th Cir., Oct. 12, 2001) (CThus, even if
we assume Singleton is Ford competent while on his medication-an assumption we hesitate to
make-it appears that there is no way of knowing how long he will remain competent once the
medication is discontinued or how long it will take to regain Ford competency once he begins
taking medication. In short, there is no way for us to know whether Singleton will be competent
on the day he is executed.:); Jenkins, supra note 8, at 178 ("The issue of drug-induced compe-
tency for the purpose of execution is fraught with absurdity .... Although the prohibition
against executing the insane has survived through the ages as a symbol of civilized society, per-
haps it would be preferable to cast aside the prohibition altogether, rather than condone the
hypocritical strategies employed to chemically mask the insane prisoner. We could avoid the
macabre, brutish ritual of psychologically and medically grooming one for execution under the
pretense of observing the humane standards preserved through our history and memorialized in
our constitution."). See generally Byers, supra note 8; Kristin Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State
v. Perry- Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death.Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life
Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L REV. 1193 (1993); Rebecca A. Miller-
Rice, Comment, The "Insane" Contradiction of Singleton v. Norris: Forced Medication in a Death
Row Inmate's Medical Interest Which Happens to Facilitate His Execution, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE
RoCK L. REv. 659 (2000); Salguero, supra note 7; Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the
"Artificially Competent": Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TUL. L REV. 1045 (1992). There are also medi-
cal ethics issues involved in treating an incompetent death row inmate at all, if successful treat-
ment will only lead to his or her execution. See Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams, The
Case of Treatment Refusal for Incompetent Prisoners Awaiting Execution, 25 NEW ENG J. ON
Cmi. & Civ. CONFINEi NT 367, 368 (1999) (discussing whether the execution of a mentally ill
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This problem is well illustrated in Coe v. Bell.252 In his tes-
timony, Dr. Kenner stated that he twice found Coe competent to be
executed, and twice found him incompetent to be executed. 253 Dr.
Kenner attributed this discrepancy to his diagnosis that Coe had
DID, which causes a person to enter into another identity when
faced with significant distress.254 Dr. Kenner opined that as execu-
tion drew near, Coe would become incompetent because he would
dissociate, but both the state courts and the federal district court
were skeptical of this diagnosis because there was proof that Coe
looked forward to dying and saw it as a release.2 55 The Sixth Circuit
specifically addressed this problem in its review of Coe's case. 25 6
After noting Justice O'Connor's concerns, the court held that the
Supreme Court in Ford did not mean to require the state to deter-
mine a prisoner's competency at the exact time of execution.
2 57
Rather, the state must make its determination when execution is
"imminent.'" 258 In this case, Coe's competency determination was
offender is in the best interest of the state and society or "the quintessential expression of judi-
cially sponsored inhumanity"). See generally Michael L. Radelet & Gorge W. Barnard, Ethics and
the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
37 (1986); Robert T.M. Phillips, Professionalism, Mental Disability, and the Death Penalty: The
Psychiatrist as Evaluator: Conflicts and Conscience, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 189 (1996). The
Supreme Court has held that prisoners can be treated with antipsychotic drugs against their
will, without violating the Due Process Clause, if they are dangerous to themselves or others.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-27 (1990).
252. Both the federal district and appellate court reviews of Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193
(Tenn. 2000), address this problem. Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1084 (2000); Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
253. Coe, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 929 (quoting Justice O'Connor's concerns in Ford). Most impor-
tantly, Dr. Kenner found Coe competent to be executed "on a good day" during his last visit on
January 12, 2000. Id. at 931.
254. Id. at 930. The court noted that the initial cause of this disorder was that Coe was ap-
parently subjected to sexual abuse by his father, at which times he would dissociate. Id. Dr.
Kenner stated that Coe typically dissociated around specific issues of "somebody threatening
him, threatening his physical integrity, threatening to abuse him in some way." Id.
255. Id. The court cited several pages of the transcript from the hearing that indicated that
Coe at times indicated that he wanted his lawyers to stop waging the competency fight and allow
him to be executed. Id. Coe had told one doctor, "I know you are here to find out if I'm crazy so
they can execute me. I am not crazy." Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 247.
256. Coe, 209 F.3d at 824-25.
257. Id. at 824.
258. Id. (citing Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998)). The court found
that the Tennessee Supreme Courts use of the term "present competency" was a proper under-
standing of competency to be executed "at his imminently scheduled execution date." Id. at 825.
The court found the imminency satisfied because the competency hearing took place in late
January 2000, and the trial court issued its decision on February 2, 2000. Id. In Stewart, the
Supreme Court held that an inmate's request for federal habeas corpus relief, which was previ-
ously dismissed as premature, was not subject to the restriction on "second or successive" appli-
cations under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2224(b). 523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998). The Court emphasized that the
previous Ford claim was dismissed as premature, not because he had not exhausted state rome-
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made while his execution was. less than two months away-
adequately imminent to satisfy due process.2 9
This problem is also well illustrated in Billiot, where all doc-
tors agreed that they would need to examine Billiot right before the
hearing to make a determination of his present competency. 260 Most
notably, Dr. McKinley testified that individuals suffering from
schizophrenia are subject to multiple remissions and relapses,
sometimes appearing completely normal and other times having a
break with reality. 261 As one doctor in another case succinctly
stated: with a paranoid schizophrenic prisoner, "there is no way of
predicting [his or her] mental state on the day of execution."262 One
court even went so far as to order that the prison officials keep the
condemned prisoner under watch, retaining jurisdiction to stay exe-
cution if any officials determined that the prisoner was not compe-
tent to be executed when the moment of execution actually ar-
rived.26
3
If courts are to take the stance that the prisoner's execution
must be "imminent" in order to determine competency, the question
remains how to apply that standard: What does "imminent" mean?
Should the definition depend on the type of mental illness from
which the prisoner suffers? Must the experts who testify at the
competency hearing have examined the prisoner in the days imme-
diately preceding the hearing?264 Should courts take into considera-
tion evidence that a prisoner will likely become more incompetent
as the date of execution nears, or only determine his or her "pre-
sent" competency to be executed?
265
dies, but "because his execution was not imminent and therefore his competency to be executed
could not be determined at that time." Id. at 644-45.
259. Coe, 209 F.3d at 825. The court held that "[w]hether the competency determination is
made in the week or the month before the prisoner's scheduled execution, the state is entitled to
exercise discretion in creating its own procedure 'as long as basic fairness is observed.' " Id. at
824-25 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 427 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)). The court
also noted that in Van Tran, Tennessee had allowed for a procedure to raise subsequent Ford
claims if there was a showing of a "substantial change in the prisoner's mental health since the
previous determination of competency was made." Id. at 825 (quoting Van Tran v. State, 6
S.W.3d 257, 272 (Tenn. 1999)).
260. See supra Part IV.C. and notes 212, 223, 245.
261. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
262. Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. 1998) (affirming the trial courtes de-
termination of competency to be executed, despite the inmate's paranoid schizophrenia and con-
flicting expert testimony as to the inmate's understanding of the reasons for his execution).
263. Weeks v. Jones, 52 F.3d 1559, 1573 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104 (1995).
264. Several of the doctors in Billiot refused to give an opinion as to present competency to be
executed because they had not examined the prisoner immediately prior to the hearing. See
supra Part P1.C.
265. See, e.g., supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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If the execution is not found to be "imminent," then the Ford
claim will presumably be dismissed as not ripe. 26 6 If, however, the
execution is found imminent, should courts deny all subsequent re-
views of the prisoner's mental health, even under extreme circum-
stances? If not, do the administrative costs and monopolization of
judicial time warrant such multiple competency determinations? If
a competency hearing is allowed in the days preceding the execu-
tion, how can the fundamental principle of thorough judicial review
be maintained? As one court pointed out, this produces a conun-
drum: if a stay is granted to determine competency once execution
is imminent, then the execution date must be postponed until such
determination is made. Ironically, the court continued, the stay it-
self would moot the reason for the stay because the execution would
no longer be imminent.267 As these concerns illustrate, significant
problems exist in the current framework for determining the immi-
nence of an execution.
B. Terminology
There is much discussion in various opinions about what
level of competency Ford requires: "awareness," "understanding,"
"knowledge," "comprehension," or "realization."268 By way of exam-
ple, in his concurring opinion in Ford, Justice Powell, at different
266. See, e.g., Hance v. Kemp, 373 S.E.2d 184, 192 (Ga. 1988) (dismissing the appellant's
Ford claim because his execution was not imminent); Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998) (dismissing petitioner's Ford claim because his execution was not imminent);
see also Steward v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998) (holding that a Ford claim
raised for the second time after his first claim was dismissed because execution was not immi.
nent was not a "second or successive" application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act); Charles M. Mallin, Death Penalty: Texas Law--Subsequent Writs and Abuse of the
Writ Doctrine in Texas, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 151, 174-75 (2000).
267. Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (D. Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845
(1999). The court explained that "[t]he circular logic goes like this: (1) there must be a pending
execution date before a Ford claim is ripe; (2) staying the execution to consider a Ford claim
effectively vacates the execution date; thus, (3) the Ford claim would not be ripe." Id. The court
compares this problem to M.C. Escher's never-ending stairway in "Ascending and Descending"
and Zeno's paradox of an arrow never reaching its target because it must cover half the distance,
then half the remainder, and so on, ad infinitum. Id. at 1040-41. The court's discussion was in
dicta because the holding was that the petitioner had not exhausted his state court remedies. Id.
at 1043.
268. See, e.g., supra notes 127, 191, 208 and accompanying text. A dictionary of psychology
offers definitions of these terms that similarly overlap: "awareness: 1. consciousness; alertness.
2. cognizance of something; a state of knowledge or understanding of environmental or internal
events," CHAPLIN, supra note 115, at 46; "understanding: 1. the process of apprehending mean-
ing" id. at 481; "comprehension: understanding, grasping; the process of reacting intelligently in
a problem situation," id. at 94.
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points, used the terms "awareness," "understands," and "perceives
the connection." - 9 State statutes have shown similar differences in
terminology.270 This imprecision leaves courts and expert witnesses
to try to distinguish between these different levels of competency.
Again, the Coe decisions 27' offer an excellent illustration of
the problem. One of Coe's claims on appeal to the Tennessee Su-
preme Court was that the trial court mistakenly required only that
he be "aware" of the fact of his impending execution and the reason
for it, rather than actually have an "understanding" of those
facts. 272 Indeed, Dr. Merikangas made just such a distinction: "I
agree that [Coe] is aware of an execution. My point is that he does
not have the mental capacity to understand."23 Dr. Merikangas
based this assertion on his opinion that Coe had a delusional belief
that when executed he would "simply be in another place in the
same body, [would] visit his ex-wife and child . . . [would] maybe
temporarily be one of these balls of fire that speaks to people."2' 4
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, cited Van Tran v. State275
in holding that a prisoner is only incompetent to be executed if he
or she is "unaware" of the punishment and the reason they are to
suffer it.276 The Coe court stated that "awareness" and "understand-
ing" should not be ascribed the technical meanings they may have
in the field of psychology in determining competency to be exe-
cuted. 77 The court based this holding on the fact that, in Ford, Jus-
tice Powell used various terms 278 when describing the Eighth
Amendment competency standard "as synonyms" for the same level
of competency.2 9 Thus, Coe's attempt to distinguish understanding
269. 477 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1986) (PoweU, J., concurring).
270. See supra Part III.
271. See supra note 107.
272. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 219 (Tenn. 2000). Coe argued, based on his expert wit-
nesses, that he had only an awareness, not an understanding. Id. at 219-20.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 220. Dr. Merikangas noted that these beliefs did not appear to be religious in na-
ture. Id.
275. 6 SAV.3d 257, 266 (Tenn. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1091 (2000).
276. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 220.
277. Id. In support of this idea, the court quoted from its own decision in Van Tran. 6 S.W.3d
at 266. In setting the standard for determining competency to be executed, the Van Tran court
used the words "unaware," "not competent," and "lacks the mental capacity to understand inter-
changeably. Id.
278. The Coe court noted that Justice Powell used "know," "perceives," "aware," and "un-
aware" in describing his competency standard. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 220; see Ford v. Wainvwight,
477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). The district court similarly dismissed Coe's
attempt to distinguish awareness from comprehension by referring to the variety of terms that
Justice Powell used. Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922, 937 n.22 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
279. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 220.
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from awareness was rejected.280 This reliance on the common defini-
tion of the words, rather than their technical meaning in the field of
psychology, is curious considering the basis for the court's finding
that Coe was competent was almost entirely the testimony of psy-
chologists and other mental health experts. 281 There does not ap-
pear to be a sound basis for a court to decide that a mental health
expert's distinction between understanding and comprehension is
not relevant to a competency determination.
The Sixth Circuit also addressed Coe's claim that the trial
court impermissibly relied on his "knowledge" that he was to be
executed, rather than his "comprehension of the sentence and its
implications. '" 28 2 In his petition, Coe relied on Justice Marshall's
statement in the plurality for Ford that a prisoner should be able to
"comprehend the nature of the penalty."28 8 The court pointed out
that Justice Marshall never actually set forth what he thought the
standard should be, so it could not "conclude he meant to do so with
this one statement. ' 28 4
This terminology problem is also illustrated in the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Provenzano v. State.2 85 The court found
that the case was "troubling" because Provenzano clearly had some
mental health problems. 286 Nevertheless, the court found that the
Eighth Amendment only requires that a defendant "be aware" of
the punishment she is about to suffer and why she has been sen-
tenced.2 87 The court then agreed with the trial court that Proven-
zano "[did] not lack the mental capacity to understand" these
280. Id.
281. Id. at 221. The court also used Coe's own actions during the hearing as evidence of his
competency. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
282. Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 826-27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000).
283. Id. at 827 n.4; see Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (Marshall, J., plurality opinion).
284. Coe, 209 F.3d at 827 n.4. The reasoning was that Justice Marshall's plurality in Ford
only addressed the issue on point-whether the procedures Florida used comported with duo
process. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Thus, the court found that the Tennessee
Supreme Court properly interpreted Justice Powell's opinion in Ford, and its adoption in Van
Tran. Coe, 209 F.3d at 827. The court also believed that Coe both understood and comprehended
the death penalty anyway. Id. at 827 n.4. In Billiot v. State, the prisoner also argued that the
trial judge had placed too much emphasis on his intelligence and not enough on his rational
understanding of his fate. 655 So. 2d 1, 15 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1095 (1996). The
court, however, found that intelligence was a proper factor on which to rely in determining com-
petency to be executed. Id.
285. 760 So. 2d 137 (Fla.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (2000); see supra Part IV.B.




facts. 288 The court apparently found no problem in using the terms
"awareness" and "understanding" interchangeably.
The dissent in Provenzano, on the other hand, focused on
Provenzano's delusions in determining the level of his acceptance of
his impending execution.2 9 This dissenting justice noted that the
trial judge struggled with what the competency standard should be,
ultimately finding that Provenzano did not need to have a "rational
acceptance" of the reasons for his execution because a maintenance
of innocence is "a fairly normal human reaction."2 0 This decision
was inappropriate, according to the dissenting justice, because
Provenzano's rejection of the reasons for his execution was based on
a delusional belief that he was being executed because he was Jesus
Christ.2 91 As he noted, Justice Powell in Ford stated that a prisoner
must be able to connect the execution to the crime for which he or
she was convicted. 292 If a prisoner like Provenzano does not realize
why he is being executed, then the retributive purpose behind the
death penalty is not served.293
The dissent in Provenzano quoted extensively from the rea-
soning in another Florida case, Martin v. Dugger.2 The Martin
court stated that if a prisoner does not appreciate the connection
between his crime and punishment, imposing the death penalty
would violate the Eighth Amendment.295 The court further held that
such an execution would be inconsistent with both the deterrence
and "channeling of anarchy" rationales behind the death penalty.296
288. Id.
289. Id. at 141 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
290. Id.
291. Id.; see supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text
292. Provenzano, 760 So. 2d at 141 (citing Ford v. Wainvright, 477 U.S. 399, 423 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
293. Id. at 143; see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text
294. 686 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1988). This case also involved a Ford claim of present com-
petency to be executed in which the federal district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to re-
solve the issue of competency. Id. at 1573. The basis of the remand was the fact that the trial
judge had failed to determine whether Martin's understanding of the nature of the death penalty
and why it was imposed on him "was grounded in reality." Id. at 1573 n.23.
295. Id. at 1569. In a discussion of the "just-desserts theory," the court added that"[iln many
respects, the execution of a prisoner who does not have this appreciation is a lesser punishment
than society intended to give." Id. (emphasis added). See Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 8 (Miss.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1095 (1996) (noting that one mental health expert found the pris-
oner not competent to be executed because he could not rationally connect what he was tried for
and the penalty of execution).
296. Martin, 686 F. Supp. at 1569-70. The channeling of anarchy theory, according to the
court, advocates that the state administer punishment in an ordered, rational fashion. Id. Thus,
the execution of someone who did not appreciate the connection between his crime and punish-
ment "is nothing more than an unrestrained act of violence" because it would "defeat the admin-
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Thus, the court held, the prisoner must appreciate the connection
between his crime and punishment both subjectively297 and objec-
tively.298 In other words, the court must determine whether the de-
fendant's logical connection between the crime and execution is
consistent with that of ordinary human experience.
299
The Fifth Circuit seemed to reject such a requirement of a
rational understanding of execution and the reasons for it in Bar-
nard v. Collins.300 The court noted that the prisoner established
through experts that his perception of the reason for his conviction
and pending execution was "at times distorted by a delusional sys-
tem in which he attributes anything negative that happens to him
to a conspiracy of Asians, Jews, Blacks, homosexuals, and the Ma-
fia."301 Nevertheless, the court found that the experts did not estab-
lish that the prisoner lacked knowledge of his impending execution
and the reason for it, as required under Ford.80 2 Similarly, in
Garrett v. Collins,30 3 the prisoner argued that he was not fully
aware of the consequences of the death penalty because he believed
his dead aunt would protect him from the effects of the sedative and
toxic agents used.30 4 The court held that "this belief of hope" does
not prevent execution under Ford because Garrett knew that "when
that needle goes into his arm that it's possible for him to suffer
death."30
5
Whether a defendant who does not think that she will actu-
ally die is "aware" of her impending fate is a related issue, as illus-
trated in Garrett3 6 and Billiot.3 7 In Singleton v. State, the Supreme
istrative organization of justice." Id. Similarly, the court reasoned, such an execution would servo
no deterrence but "would be tantamount to an act of inhumanity." Id. at 1570.
297. "The subjective part is nothing more than the defendant's perception of the connection
between his crime and punishment." Id.
298. "The objective aspect of this realization test ... determines whether the defendant's
subjective understanding is grounded in reality; that is, is rational." Id.
299. Id. at 1570 n.20. The court found this requirement consistent with Justice Powell's lan-
guage in Ford. Id. at 1571. But see Arrigo & Williams, supra note 251, at 406 CThus, to be com-
petent under the law, is to be qualified or to be fit. It is the capacity to make one's own decisions,
regardless of how ridiculous the choices appear.").
300. 13 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1994). Barnard involved a Ford claim out of Texas in which the
court denied the petitioner's application for a stay of execution. Id. at 877.
301. Id. at 876.
302. Id. at 877.
303. 951 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1992).
304. Id. at 58.
305. Id. at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that this hope of escaping
death did not prevent Garrett's ability to prepare for his passing. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986)).
306. Id.
307. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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Court of South Carolina found such a belief sufficient to support a
finding of incompetency to be executed.308 The court held that, be-
cause of his reliance on "protective genes," Singleton was com-
pletely unaware that he was capable of dying in the electric chair. 3 9
As these cases make clear, current standards for determin-
ing competency to be executed simply do not adequately distinguish
between a prisoner's awareness, knowledge, and comprehension of
their impending fate. Often, expert witnesses do distinguish be-
tween these levels of awareness. 310 Is mere awareness all that is
required by the Eighth Amendment? If so, how can a court decide
that a prisoner who thinks she is being punished for some other
reason,311 or will not actually die,3 12 is really aware of her execution
and the reason for it, although clearly not comprehending it?
C. Other Problems
1. Conjunctive or Disjunctive?
The district court in Coe v. Bell noted an additional problem
resulting from vague standards for determining competency. 313 Coe
raised a claim that Tennessee's standard for competency set forth
in Van Tran 14 violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because it was a "conjunctive standard that requires a petitioner to
prove both an 'unawareness' of the execution, as well as an 'un-
awareness' of the reason for the execution."315 Since the defendant
bears the burden of showing his or her incompetency to be executed,
this fact would mean that someone aware of the punishment, but
unaware of the reasons for it, would still be competent for execu-
tion.3 16 The court stated that this assertion "may technically be
308. 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (S.C. 1993). The court adopted the ABA Standards and its two-prong
test as the standard for determining competency, finding that Singleton failed to pass either the
"cognitive" or the "assistance" prongs. Id.
309. Id.
310. See generally supra Part IV.
311. See, e.g., Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137, 141 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead, J., dissenting)
(discussing Provenzano's belief that he was being executed because he was Jesus Christ).
312. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
313. 89 F. Supp. 2d 922, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
314. Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1091 (2000); see su-
pra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
315. Coe, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 939. Coe's claim was presumably based on the Eighth Amend-
mentes ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV.
316. Coe, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 939.
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true," but that as applied in that case it was not an issue because
Coe was found to be aware of both the impending execution and the
reasons for it.317 There is reason to believe this problem could be at
issue in future decisions, however, because such vagueness perme-
ates several states' standards. 318 For example, both Florida and
Texas use conjunctive standards, 319 while Arizona and Missouri use
disjunctive standards.
320
The difference between a conjunctive and disjunctive stan-
dard cannot be overstated. If a prisoner must prove both that she
does not understand that she will soon be executed, and that she
does not understand why she was sentenced to death, then that
burden will rarely be met. All a state would have to do is prove one
or the other and the execution would proceed, no matter how defi-
cient the prisoner's understanding with regard to the other part of
the test. If, however, the standard is disjunctive, then it is the pris-
oner who must only prove a lack of understanding of either the im-
pending execution or the reasons for it. Based on the rationales be-
hind the rule against executing the insane3 21 and the fact that the
prisoner bears the burden of proof,322 a disjunctive standard is more
logical. Most likely, Justice Powell in Ford meant that a person is
only competent if the state proves both awareness of execution and
awareness of the reason for it.323 It is awkward to phrase the test
from the standpoint of the state, however, and then place the bur-
den on the prisoner. A clearer and more just test would provide that
317. Id.
318. Justice Powell also announced a conjunctive test. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
319. FLA. R. CRIM. P. R. 3.811(b) (2000) ("A person under sentence of death is insane for pur-
poses of execution if the person lacks the mental capacity to understand the fact of the impend-
ing execution and the reason for it."); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.04(h) (Vernon 2000) CA
defendant is incompetent to be executed if the defendant does not understand: (1) that he or she
is to be executed and that the execution is imminent; and (2) the reason he or she is being exe-
cuted.").
320. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021(B) (West 2000) ("As used in this article, 'mentally in-
competent to be executed' means that due to a mental disease or defect a person who is sen-
tenced to death is presently unaware that he is to be punished for the crime of murder or that he
is unaware that the impending punishment for that crime is death."); MO. ANN. STAT. §
552.060(1) (West 2000) ('No person condemned to death shall be executed if as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment
about to be imposed upon him or matters in extenuation, arguments for clemency or reasons why
the sentence should not be carried out.").
321. See supra Part II.B.
322. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
323. 'See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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a prisoner should not be executed if she can prove that she is un-
aware either of her impending fate or the reasons for it.324
2. "Insane" or "Incompetent"?
At least one commentator has noted that, although the terms
"incompetent" and "insane" have been used interchangeably to de-
scribe those protected under Ford, "not only are these terms ar-
chaic,325 but they are also an imprecise means of initially identify-
ing the members of the group that Ford envisions protecting."3 26 In
fact, "insanity" is not generally recognized as a psychological diag-
nosis at all.327 After noting the wide range of choices for terms,3 28
the author notes that "[u]ltimately, the decision as to which term or
phrase to adopt will be contingent upon the manner in which Ford
should be interpreted."3 29 Upon this author's reading of Ford, the
most appropriate term might be "severe mental impairment."330
Given a court's reliance on mental health experts to determine
competency to be executed, the choice of terminology can prove ex-
tremely important.3 1
324. For a suggested statutory test, see infra Part VI.B.
325. See supra note 28.
326. Harding, supra note 43, at 130. A dictionary of psychology defines "incompetence" as
"lacking the necessary ability or qualification properly to carry out a task," and stated that "[i]n
psychiatric literature, incompetence refers to a state characteristic of insane or mentally deficient
persons who, because of their deficiency, are not legally responsible." CHAPLIN, supra note 115,
at 224. It also defines "insanity" as "a serious mental disorder that renders the individual inca-
pable of conducting his affairs in a competent manner," and states that "fi]nsanity is a legal, not
a psychological term." Id. at 231.
327. Id.
328. "The potential choices range from broad terms, such as 'mental disorder,' 'mental im-
pairment,' or 'mental affliction,' to narrower and more specific terms, such as 'mental illness,'
'mental retardation,' or 'psychiatric disorder.'" Harding, supra note 43, at 130.
329. Id. The reason is that the rule against executing incompetent prisoners is based on the
Eighth Amendment.
330. Id. at 133. The problem of defining "mental illness" dates at least as far back as 1955,
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the term to include "mental abnormalities which
would not come within strict connotation of the term legal insanity." Commonwealth v. Moon,
117 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 1955). More recently, however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found
that Ford proscribes "the execution of an insane person, not the imposition of sentence on a men-
tally ill person." Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see State v. Nix,
40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that "mental illness is not the equivalent of mental
incompetence" (citing Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 221 Crenn. 2000)).
331. See infra Part VI.B.
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3. Subjective Judicial Judgment
Most often, several experts offer competing testimony on the
issue of the prisoner's competency to be executed. 332 In fact, these
experts sometimes admit that the diagnoses of other mental health
experts, although different from their own, are reasonable. 33 As
Justice Powell noted in Ford, "[T]he competency determination de-
pends on expert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and
nuances.' "334 Nevertheless, the question of the prisoner's sanity
"calls for a basically subjective judgment."335 Since the ultimate de-
cision rests with the judge, 336 she should be given a more detailed
definition of "competency to be executed" than is presently given
under Ford or the applicable state statute.3
37
In Weeks v. Jones, 338 the Eleventh Circuit commended the
trial judge, who "ultimately had to determine Weeks's competency
to be executed," for directly intervening to ask the prisoner ques-
tions to assist in his competency determination.3 39 The questioning,
according to the trial judge, was "for the purpose of gaining insight
into his mental processes, of trying to determine how his mind was
operating, and of 'probing into his mind and how he views the world
and what he knows and [ ] how he perceives things.' ",340 It is argu-
able that such judicial intervention is an appropriate means of aid-
332. See supra Part IV. For example, in Coe v. State, one doctor diagnosed Coe as suffering
from DID, while another testified that he was skeptical about whether the condition of DID
existed at all. 17 S.W.3d 193, 234, 243 (Tenn. 2000). The trial court itself stated that it had some
question about the diagnosis of DID, although recognizing that it was not an expert in the field of
mental health disorders. Id. at 235.
333. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
334. 477 U.S. 399, 427 (1986) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)).
335. Id.
336. In most cases, the judge has made the final determination of insanity as required by
statute. See supra Part III.A. For an example of a jury making the determination of present
sanity to be executed, see Garrison v. State, 378 P.2d 401, 402 (Colo. 1963).
337. This problem is all the more acute because the standard for determining competency to
be executed is distinct from the standards for competency to stand trial or waive right to counsel.
See, e.g., Ce v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 826-27 (6th Cir.) C'Because competency to be executed in-
volves different interests than competency to stand trial in the first instance, we do not believe
that a state rigidly must apply the competency-to-stand-trial standard in this context where it
does not make sense in modern practice."), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000). For a current
discussion of involuntarily medicating defendants during trial, see generally Dora W. Klein,
Note, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case Against Administering Involuntary Medica.
tions to a Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2002).
338. 52 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104 (1995).
339. Id. at 1562. The petitioner's answers to these questions were used to supplement the
testimony of expert witnesses. Id.
340. Id. at 1561 (quoting the transcript from the competency hearing).
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ing a judge in his ultimate decision, especially if there is conflicting
expert testimony based on technical psychological terminology. On
the other hand, it is also arguable that such a determination of
mental health should be left completely to experts. If the latter is
true, then how is the judge to decide among competing experts? The
answer probably lies in statutorily defining "incompetency to be
executed" with the actual language the judge will hear from the ex-
pert witnesses in mind.341
4. Evidence of Pre-sentence Mental State
Courts have also struggled with the issue of whether, under
a hearing for present competency to be executed, evidence of the
prisoner's mental state before his or her sentencing should be con-
sidered relevant. 342 For example, in Garrison v. State,34 3 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court remanded the case for another competency
hearing because the trial judge refused to admit evidence of Garri-
son's mental state before his sentencing.344 The prisoner offered
such evidence not to prove his mental condition at an earlier time,
but to shed light on his current mental condition by showing a fam-
ily history of mental illness, which supported his theory that his
present incompetence "was not an 'over night thing,' but rather the
logical culmination of a long, drawn-out process of mental deterio-
ration.'' 34 Should such evidence of prior mental illnesses always be
admitted in a competency hearing, or only when it is shown to be
relevant to the issue of current competency to be executed?
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS To THE PROBLEM
A. The Current Requirement of Mental Health Experts
Most states, in order to comply with Ford, require courts to
appoint a panel of doctors once there is a threshold showing of in-
competence. 34 If the prisoner offers only lay opinions instead of ex-
341. See infra Part VI.B.
342. See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 378 P.2d 401, 403-04 (Colo. 1963).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 404.
345. Id. at 403; see Massie v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a history
of mental problems was inadequate to prove incompetency to be executed).
346. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.04(f) (Vernon 2001) C(f the court determines
that the defendant has made a substantial showing of incompetency, the court shall order at
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pert testimony, his or her Ford claim is unlikely to succeed. 347 In
fact, courts tend to rely on nonexpert testimony only if there is
some action by the prisoner himself or herself showing that they are
competent. 348 Thus, although the judge makes the ultimate decision
in any judicial proceeding, 349 she will inevitably be forced to decide
between competing expert opinions. 3 0 The experts will, of course,
disagree since each side will present mental health experts whose
diagnoses aid their own cause. In fact, the basis of the Ford plural-
ity's finding that Florida's procedure did not comport with due
process was that the lower court's decision was based solely on
state-appointed psychiatrists, without allowing the prisoner to offer
his own experts.3 51 As a result, the judge typically listens to several
expert witnesses, who testify as to their psychiatric determinations,
and then decides whom to believe.
352
least two mental health experts to examine the defendant.... ."); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d
257, 269 (Tenn. 1999) ('If, however, the court determines that the prisoner has satisfied the
threshold showing, the trial court shall enter an order appointing at least one, but no more than
two, mental health professionals from each list submitted by the respective parties."). Those
states that do not require such a panel of experts allow one. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. R.
3.812(c) (2000) C(The court may do any of the following... (2) appoint no more than 3 disinter-
ested mental health experts to examine the prisoner with respect to the criteria for insanity to be
executed and to report their findings and conclusions to the court.., the court may admit such
evidence as the court deems relevant to the issues, including but not limited to the reports of
expert witnesses ...."). As a matter of practice, courts in these states do rely on such experts.
See, e.g., Provenzano v. State, 760 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (2000).
347. See, e.g., Cox v. Norris, 167 F.3d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the testimony
of fellow inmates as to the petitioner's idiosyncratic behavior was insufficient for a finding of
incompetency to be executed); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir.) (agreeing with the
district court that petitioner's three lay witnesses when "juxtaposed" against the testimony of the
state's highly qualified experts left them "not impressed"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991);
Schornhorst v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 944, 955 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that the presumption
of insanity could not be overcome by affidavit of a clergyman).
348. See, e.g., supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text; see also Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d
633, 640-41 (5th Cir.) (relying not on expert testimony, but the petitioner's own testimony to find
that he was competent to be executed), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1153 (1995). Although this seems
illogical, it coincides with the presumption of competency based on the fact that the prisoner
must have been found competent at trial in order to have been sentenced to death in the first
place. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
349. See, e.g., Weeks v. Jones, 52 F.3d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir.) C'While the trial judge gave
Weeks every opportunity to present all of the witnesses and evidence that he desired, the judge
ultimately had to determine Weeks's competency to be executed."), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104
(1995).
350. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Coe v. State).
351. 477 U.S. at 412-13.
352. In Martin v. Dugger, the district court discredited the state judge's determination of
sanity because he did not actually have all the experts appear before the court. 686 F. Supp.
1523, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1988). These witnesses are generally found persuasive only if they have
personally examined the prisoner by conducting psychiatric tests. See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 408
P.2d 60, 62 (Colo. 1965) (holding that a doctor may use some information outside of his own
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These requirements set up a pattern of reliance on expert
testimony in deciding competency to be executed. The testimony of
these experts, however, necessarily consists of the use of psychiatric
methods to make a professional opinion as to the prisoner's mental
health. Often, the experts do not even make a finding of "compe-
tency to be executed," but testify as to some specific mental problem
from which the prisoner suffers.353 The judge is left with the daunt-
ing task of translating psychiatric terminology into layman's lan-
guage of "competency to be executed." In order to make this choice,
the judge must ponder obscure medical diagnoses. For example, the
trial judge in Coe v. State was bombarded by numerous descriptions
of the prisoner's mental health problems: "schizophrenic," "dissocia-
tive identity disorder," "psychotic," "schizoaffective disorder (bipolar
type)," "antisocial personality disorder," "schizotypal personality
disorder," "pseudologica fantastica," and "mild dementia of un-
known etiology," among others. 354 This job is made even more diffi-
cult by the specific distinctions about competency as to which men-
tal experts testify.35 5 These distinctions may result in different out-
comes depending on which expert the judge actually understands at
the hearing, rather than on which expert's analysis is most rigor-
ous. 3 5 6
Often, the judge expresses discomfort in making a decision in
the face of substantial medical evidence of genuine mental disor-
ders, but still finds competency because the burden of proof is on
the prisoner to show his or her incompetence by a preponderance of
the evidence.3 57 For example, in Billiot v. State,35 each of the doc-
tors agreed that a person could be schizophrenic and incompetent to
be executed, or schizophrenic and competent to be executed. 359 The
doctors, however, disagreed on which of these situations described
examination, but only if his opinion was not in any manner based on that information); see also
Mark A. Small & Randy K Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be Executed: Legal Contours and
Implications forAssessment, 18 CRlM. JUST. & BEHAV. 146, 152-55 (1991) (describing appropriate
tests for psychologists to use in determining competency to be executed).
353. See supra Part IV.C (discussing Billiot v. State).
354. See 17 S.W.3d 193, 201-06 (Tenn. 2000).
355. Id. at 219.
356. See supra Parts IV.A-C.
357. See, e.g., Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 247-48 ("It appears to this Court that Petitioner is suffering
from some sort of personality disorder, as attested by the majority of the mental health experts
... this Court has no choice but to find that Petitioner is competent to be executed.") (emphasis
added).
358. 655 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1995).
359. Id. at 4-9. But see Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir.) (quoting a psycholo-
gist as stating that, as a paranoid schizophrenic, the prisoner's capacity to understand the death
penalty would necessarily be impaired), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988).
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the prisoner, and the court was forced to choose among witnesses it
had accepted as experts. 360 This problem is acute considering that
the judge is usually a layperson who, despite substantial effort,
simply cannot be qualified to evaluate a medical expert's testimony
for its scientific validity. The judge is ultimately left deliberating
over which expert witness was the most persuasive. The decision,
perhaps unintentionally, may well depend on the expert witness's
personality, approach, or articulation, rather than on sound medical
judgment.
B. Carefully Crafted Statutory Definitions
One possible remedy to this problem is for states to more
carefully define "incompetent to be executed" in their statutes.3 61 A
legislature, unlike a court, can spend ample time hearing ideas
from both legal experts and various medical experts and organiza-
tions to come up with a standard that will aid the judge in his or
her final legal determination of competency. Such a legislative act
would also result in a more uniform application of the standard for
competency to be executed, as well as ensure that no incompetent
persons are executed. Since judges most often rely on expert testi-
mony to reach their conclusions, one approach would be to use ac-
tual medical terminology in the statutory definition. Given the
broad range of medical terms, however, it is certainly not possible
or desirable to make a list of specific disorders that will qualify for
"incompetency to be executed." Nevertheless, a legislature can at
least produce a more descriptive definition of what is meant by
"understanding" or "awareness."362 In the end, the final decision
will still lie in the subjective judgment of a judge.3 63 Yet, if the ex-
pert witnesses whom the judge hears were given a medical defini-
tion of "incompetence" to use in their examination of the prisoner,
the judge would be left with less conflicting testimony. Such an ap-
proach would not only preserve justice, but the prisoner, the judge,
and society as a whole could feel more confident that the principle
announced in Ford has been upheld.
There might be some problems with this approach, which
would, essentially, by statute require judicial dependence on expert
psychiatric witnesses. Are these experts making factual findings or
360. Billiot, 655 So. 2d at 9.
361. See supra Part III for current statutory definitions.
362. For a suggestion, see infra at 2489-91.
363. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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essentially drawing legal conclusions?36 Should expert witnesses
really be the ultimate decisionmakers? 3 5 As noted above, however,
courts are already relying substantially on mental health experts. If
they are going to do so anyway, then the law should give expert
witnesses a clearer definition with which to work. Furthermore,
any fear that psychiatrists will take over the role of the judge ex-
udes a lack of confidence in the adversarial system. As the Ford
plurality held, both parties should be able to offer their own experts
and present arguments at a competency hearing.
366
Below is a suggestion36 7 of how a more carefully crafted
statutory formulation might be expressed:
(A) A person shall be found incompetent to be exe-
cuted if, as a result of a severe mental impair-
ment, he or she does not understand:
(1) that he or she is going to be executed;
(2) that this execution is imminent;
(3) that this execution will lead to his or her
death; or
(4) the reason the state is executing him or her.
If the preponderance of the evidence demon-
strates a lack of understanding of any one of
these factors, the execution shall be stayed. The
person alleging incompetency shall bear the
burden of proving incompetency.
(B) For purposes of this section, "to understand"
shall mean to grasp the meaning of an event or
situation and its significance in the same man-
ner as would an average person facing execution.
364. See Paul J. Larkin, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompe-
tent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 802-03 (1980) (stressing the importance of judicial superv-ision of
psychiatric determinations); Small & Otto, supra note 352, at 156 (calling the competency to be
executed question a "moral-legal" one that clinicians should avoid answering).
365. See Ward, supra note 8, at 76-87. The author explains that if the prohibition against
executing the insane is rooted in society's distaste for the death penalty, then the determination
of insanity should depend entirely on medical opinion without the addition of a judge or jury. Id.
at 88. If the rule is based on a retribution theory, however, then a jury should make the determi-
nation and psychiatric input should be discouraged. Id. at 88-89.
366. 477 U.S. at 412-13 (Marshall, J., plurality opinion).
367. An assistance prong is not included in this formulation, based on the reasons discussed
by Justice Powell in Ford v. Wainwright. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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If a person understands that execution is immi-
nent and that he or she was found guilty at trial
of a crime punishable by death, but he or she
does not rationally understand that these two
events are causally connected, the person shall
be found incompetent to be executed. Mere
knowledge or awareness of an impending execu-
tion, without a rational understanding of the
reasons for it, is not sufficient to find compe-
tency to be executed. Evidence from an expert
witness that the person is so deluded that he or
she simply cannot relate the crime to the pun-
ishment is evidence of such lack of a rational
understanding. The person need not admit guilt
or accept the judgment of the court to be deter-
mined competent to be executed. His or her be-
liefs about what will happen to him or her after
death are not relevant to the determination of
competency.
(C) A person sentenced to death is entitled to a judi-
cial determination of his or her competency to be
executed if a judge determines that there has
been a threshold showing of incompetency. A de-
termination of competency to be executed shall
be made at a competency hearing held when the
execution is imminent. At this competency hear-
ing, the court shall provide both the prosecution
and the defense an opportunity to present expert
testimony based on physical examinations, test-
ing, or personal interviews of the inmate, as well
as allow for arguments by counsel. The court
shall allow up to four (4) mental health expert
witnesses to testify for each party.
(D) For purposes of this section, "imminent" shall
mean that the execution is to occur within thirty
(30) days from the time of the competency hear-
ing.
(E) At the judge's discretion, upon a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person
suffers from a mental disorder that is likely to
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become more severe as the time of execution
draws near, a supplemental competency hearing
shall be held within three (3) days of the date of
execution. In the event that the state supreme
court hears an appeal of this supplemental com-
petency determination, the execution shall be
stayed. If the supreme court affirms a determi-
nation of competency, the execution shall pro-
ceed within three (3) days from the date of the
supreme court's judgment.
(F) All final determinations of competency to be exe-
cuted shall be made by a judge, but substantially
based on the testimony of witnesses who are ac-
cepted by the court as experts in the field of
mental health.
C. The Supreme Court Solution
If state legislatures are unwilling or unable to set forth more
well-defined standards for determining competency to be executed,
then it is time for the United States Supreme Court to finish the
task that it began in Ford v. Wainwright,30 and give a more de-
scriptive definition of what the Eighth Amendment requires with
regard to executing an incompetent inmate. 369 Since the rule
against executing an incompetent person is based on the Eighth
Amendment, and the procedures to determine such competency
must comply with the Due Process Clause, action by the Supreme
Court would not be inappropriate.370 Although the Court would be
unlikely to use scientific terminology, a majority could at least give
more than a one sentence standard for defining competency to be
executed, especially considering the finality and seriousness of the
issue of capital punishment.3 71 As one court succinctly stated, "Ford
368. See supra Part U.C.
369. The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari on cases involving competency to
be executed since deciding Ford v. Wainwright. See, e.g., Provenzano v. Moore, 530 U.S. 1256
(2000); Medina v. Florida, 520 U.S. 1151 (1997); Billiot v. Mississippi. 516 U.S. 1095 (1996);
Fearance v. Scott, 515 U.S. 1153 (1995); Rector v. Butler, 501 U.S. 1239 (1991); Lowenfield v.
Butler, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988).
370. See supra Part 1.C.
371. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally Donnelly, supra note 7
(describing the Justices' views based on their opinions in past death penalty cases).
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v. Wainwright is a precedential quagmire. 372 More careful use of
the terms "understanding," "awareness," and "knowledge" would be
the first step in this standard.
373
The problem with the Supreme Court solution was noted by
Justice Powell in Ford: "States are obviously free to adopt a more
expansive view of sanity in this context than the one the Eighth
Amendment imposes as a constitutional minimum." 374 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court could define the constitutional minimum stan-
dard more carefully and fully, and provide the states with a
thoughtful discussion of the issues involved in determining compe-
tency to be executed. At the very least, such an approach would re-
sult in more uniform standards and applications of those standards
among the different states.
37 5
VII. CONCLUSION
The rule against executing an incompetent person is firmly
ingrained in the American legal system. The Supreme Court offi-
cially adopted this stance in Ford, although only Justice Powell's
concurring opinion offered a definition of what it means to be in-
competent to be executed.3 76 A majority of states have accepted Jus-
tice Powell's single-prong test from Ford: whether the inmate un-
derstands her impending execution and the reasons for it. Other
states have adopted a two-prong test, which includes both Justice
Powell's "cognitive" prong, as well as an "assistance" prong requir-
ing that the inmate be able to assist counsel in her own defense.
These vague definitions, when applied to actual cases, have proven
to be fraught with difficulties.
3 77
372. Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
373. See supra Part V.B.
374. 477 U.S. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
375. See Rector v. Butler, 501 U.S. 1239, 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
the issue of the standard for determining competency to be executed as not only unsettled, but
also recurring and important); Byers, supra note 8, at 365 ("Until the Court directly confronts
the issue of defining competence for execution, no uniform standard will exist."); see also Brent E.
Newton, A Case Study in Systematic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty, 1973.1994, 1 TEX.
FORUM ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 36-37 (1994) (noting that Justice Blackmun, while in theory supporting
the death penalty, became frustrated in his efforts to develop procedural and substantive rules to
ensure fairness, finally conceding that "the death penalty experiment has failed." (quoting
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from a denial of certio-
rari)).
376. 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
377. See supra Parts IV and V.
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Courts generally require a competency determination to be
made while the execution is "imminent," but they face significant
difficulties in deciding what this term means. This problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that prisoners can continue until the day of exe-
cution to claim that they have become incompetent since the previ-
ous competency hearing. 378 Courts have also struggled with what
level of comprehension the statutes require: understanding, knowl-
edge, awareness, or rational comprehension. When confronted with
multiple mental health experts, who each use different medical
terms to describe the prisoner's exact mental problems, the judge is
left with the unenviable task of reaching a conclusion. How should
she apply these medical terms to the common language definition of
incompetency to be executed? Does it ultimately come down to
which mental health expert made the most appealing presentation
at the competency hearing?
This Note suggests that state legislatures help solve these
problems by carefully crafting a more comprehensive definition for
determining competency to be executed. In the alternative, the Su-
preme Court should finish what it started in Ford v. Wainwright,
and provide a definition of competency to be executed that can be
applied more uniformly across the country. In the very least, the
Court could provide some guidance for judges who are duty-bound
to decide whether or not an inmate is executed. Currently, these
judges are often left sifting through a medical dictionary in an at-
tempt to translate a psychologist's testimony into a judicial decision
and an opinion explaining that decision. A clearer definition of
competency to be executed would aid both mental health experts
and judges in deciding Ford claims.
There is no question that this issue is of paramount impor-
tance. Time should be spent to ensure that the rule against execut-
ing the insane is being applied properly in actual cases. State legis-
latures and the Supreme Court owe such an effort not just to pris-
oners facing death, but to a society yearning for a restored con-
science.
John L. Farringer IV
378. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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